Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 64

Issue 3

Article

6-1-2016

Derivatives Clearinghouses: Clearing the Way to Failure
Hester Peirce
George Mason University

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Law Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Hester Peirce, Derivatives Clearinghouses: Clearing the Way to Failure, 64 Clev. St. L. Rev. 589 (2016)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

DERIVATIVES CLEARINGHOUSES: CLEARING
THE WAY TO FAILURE
HESTER PEIRCE
ABSTRACT
One of the major components of Dodd-Frank was a comprehensive regulatory
framework for over-the-counter derivatives. A key feature of this framework is a
requirement that many of these derivatives be cleared through central counterparty
clearinghouses. Clearinghouses have long played a stabilizing force in many
markets, but Dodd-Frank’s regulatory mandate may adversely affect the way they
operate. Risk management by clearinghouses and market participants could suffer,
and improper risks could find their way into clearinghouses. If a clearinghouse were
to fail, there would be tremendous pressure for the government to bail it out in the
name of financial stability. Dodd-Frank’s derivatives framework should be
reconsidered before it destabilizes the financial system. A better approach would
empower market participants to decide whether to use clearinghouses and would
allow clearinghouses the regulatory latitude to effectively manage their risks.
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INTRODUCTION
The remaking of the United States derivatives markets is among the most
celebrated pieces of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).1 The Dodd-Frank reform, however, has unnecessarily
destabilized the financial markets through mandatory reliance on central
counterparties (“CCPs”), which are financial institutions that collect derivatives
transactions from many market participants and manage the associated risks. A
better approach would be to abandon the central clearing mandate and the associated
trading mandate and allow the derivatives markets to develop through market—not
regulatory—mechanisms. Combined with principles-based regulation for CCPs and
robust regulatory reporting, an organically developed market structure would enable
the derivatives markets to mitigate risk—including through the voluntary use of
CCPs—without undermining financial stability.
Derivatives are financial contracts that derive their value from the price of
something else, such as a commodity, stock, bond, index, or currency. These
contracts—which include futures, forwards, swaps, and options—enable companies
and individuals to shift risks to parties willing to bear that risk. Financial and nonfinancial companies use derivatives to manage a wide array of risks, including
foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, and counterparty risk.
Many derivatives trade on exchanges and are cleared through CCPs, which are
often affiliated with the exchange.2 These derivatives adhere to a standard set of
terms governing each aspect of the contract. Derivatives also can be executed offexchange in a bilateral transaction between a dealer (usually a large bank)3 and
another dealer or customer. These bilateral transactions afford substantial flexibility
in contract terms to accommodate the unique needs of the customer. Accordingly,
risks that are particular to the specific transactions or to a specific company are
typically managed through bilateral transactions and are not cleared through CCPs.
Reform advocates often cite uncleared, over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives
(also referred to as “swaps” in this article) as a core cause of the crisis and posit
mandatory central clearing as a key solution.4 Their theory is that large banks and
1

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 22,
26, 28, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
2
In the United States futures markets, exchanges typically are vertically integrated with
clearinghouses, whereas clearinghouses in the equities and options markets are independent of
exchanges. See Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of Regulation of Clearing in
the Securities and Futures Markets and Its Impact on Competition, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 313, 346-47 (2010) (discussing why these markets developed differently).
3
The United States derivatives market is concentrated; four commercial banks—
JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, Citibank, and Goldman Sachs—have approximately
ninety percent of the banking industry’s derivatives. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES
THIRD QUARTER 16, 17 (2015), http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financialmarkets/trading/derivatives/dq315.pdf [hereinafter OCC QUARTERLY REPORT].
4

When discussing derivatives, Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew remarked that:
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other large financial firms were dangerously bound together through a nontransparent web of derivatives exposures. Dodd-Frank proffered mandatory central
clearing, which substitutes a central clearinghouse for the bilateral relationship
between the parties to an OTC transaction, as the best way to bring order to the
chaos of the large OTC derivative markets. To complement central clearing, DoddFrank imposes trading and reporting mandates with the goal of making the OTC
markets more transparent and competitive.5
This Article argues that the combination of clearing mandates, government
prescriptions regarding clearinghouse design, and government support for CCPs
threatens financial stability. As Professor Craig Pirrong warned, “a wholesale reengineering of the structure of derivatives markets via legislative fiat is fraught with
danger.”6 A preferable approach would eliminate government backstops and leave
During 2008, when Lehman Brothers went under and AIG nearly collapsed, the
complex web of bilateral derivatives contracts was a critical driver of the financial
meltdown. But there was no statutory authority to set standards for this market. Wall
Street Reform changed that . . . . Opaque bilateral trading is being replaced by central
clearing and transparent trading. And all trades must be reported.
Jacob L. Lew, Secretary, Dept’t of Treasury, Remarks at the Brookings Institution (July 8,
2015),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/Remarks-by-TreasurySecretary-Jacob-J.-Lew-at-The-Brookings-Institution.aspx. Chairman Gary Gensler, also in
support of OTC derivatives, stated that:
A key measure included in the financial reform bill currently being debated in the
Senate would require standard over-the-counter derivatives to be cleared by central
clearinghouses. This will greatly reduce risk, interconnectedness and the need for
future bailouts. Financial institutions would be freer to fail with limited effects on the
broader economy.
Gary Gensler, Clearinghouses Are the Answer, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704671904575194463642611160.
5
See, e.g., A Transformed Marketplace – Remarks of Chairman Gary Gensler’s Before the
FIA 2013 Futures & Options Expo, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (Nov. 6,
2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-151 (“Now, as a result of
reforms, swap execution facilities (SEFs) are required to provide all market participants with
impartial access. They must provide dealers and non-dealers alike the ability to make and respond
to bids, offers and requests for quotes. This is a basic tenant [sic] that Adam Smith and so many
economists have laid out – that access and transparency promote competition and benefit the
economy.”); Ilya Beylin, A Reassessment of the Clearing Mandate: How the Clearing Mandate
Affects Swap Trading Behavior and the Consequences for Systemic Risk 51-52 (Oct. 20, 2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2613779_
code701120.pdf?abstractid=2612755&mirid=1 (discussing the potential for the combination of
trading and clearing mandates to diminish dealers’ hold on the swaps market). The trading mandate
is falling short of this goal due to implementation problems. See, e.g., Statement from
Commissioner J. Christopher Giancarlo Reconsidering the CFTC’s Swap Trading Rules for
Greater Effectiveness in the Global Economy, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
(Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/giancarlostatement111214
(“The CFTC’s flawed SEF framework is causing a range of unintended adverse consequences. For
one, it is ensuring that big platforms get bigger and small platforms get squeezed out because of the
sharply increased legal and compliance costs of registering and operating a SEF.”).
6

CRAIG PIRRONG, THE INEFFICIENCY OF THE CLEARING MANDATE, POLICY ANALYSIS 33
(2010), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA665.pdf [hereinafter PIRRONG,
INEFFICIENCY].
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decisions about which products should be centrally cleared and how CCPs should
operate to private decision-makers. The current regulatory framework would be
replaced by a principles-based regulatory approach and mandatory reporting of
swaps transactions.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes OTC derivatives and
clearinghouses and how they are regulated under Dodd-Frank. Part II describes why
this framework is problematic. Part III posits an alternate framework.
I. OTC DERIVATIVES, CLEARINGHOUSES, AND THEIR NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
Derivative contracts include a wide array of financial instruments subject to
different regulatory regimes. The uniting theme is that a derivative is a “contract
between two parties providing for a payoff from one party to the other determined by
the price of an asset, an exchange rate, a commodity price, or an interest rate.”7 The
financial instruments on which derivatives are based include currencies, interest
rates, commodities, and debt and equity securities. Derivatives contracts typically do
not call for immediate performance; these contracts can last for weeks, months, or
even years. Options, futures, forwards, and swaps are types of derivatives.8 Of
particular interest after the financial crisis, credit default swaps (“CDS”), protect
buyers from negative credit events such as corporate or sovereign bond defaults.9
American International Group’s (“AIG”) notorious crisis-era CDS transactions10
7

DON M. CHANCE & ROBERT BROOKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES AND RISK
MANAGEMENT 625 (7th ed. 2004); see also Viral V. Acharya et al., Derivatives: The Ultimate
Financial Innovation, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 233 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) (“Derivatives
are financial contracts whose value is derived from some underlying asset. These assets can
include equities and equity indices, bonds, loans, interest rates, exchange rates, commodities,
residential and commercial mortgages, and even catastrophes like earthquakes and
hurricanes.”); JOHN HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 1 (7th ed. 2009) (“A
derivative can be defined as a financial instrument whose value depends on (or derives from)
the value of other, more basic, underlying variables.”); BRUCE TUCKMAN, IN DEFENSE OF
DERIVATIVES: FROM BEER TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, POLICY ANALYSIS 2 (2015) (“A derivative
is a contract between two parties that [c]ommits to exchange cash, goods, or securities in the
future; [r]equires little or nothing in the way of an up-front payment; and [i]s written in a legal
form that allows for swift remedial action in the event of a default—that is, without the
approval of a bankruptcy court.”).
8 See Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#10 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
9

More precisely, a “credit default swap is a credit derivative contract in which one party
(protection buyer) pays [a] periodic fee to another party (protection seller) in return for
compensation for default (or similar credit event) by a reference entity.” Id. CDS received
negative attention because some financial institutions engaged in these transactions without
adequate risk controls and positive attention because CDS provided useful information to
regulators and market participants trying to assess particular financial institutions’ well-being
during the turbulent time of 2007 through 2009.
10
Although the narrative about AIG’s troubled CDS business drove much of the push for
central clearing, contrary to the popular narrative, there were significant non-derivatives
contributors to AIG’s crisis. See, e.g., Hester Peirce, Securities Lending and the Untold Story
in the Collapse of AIG (Mercatus Center, George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-12,
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obscure the valuable informational role other CDS played during the crisis.11 In any
case, as the following chart shows, CDS make up only a small subset of OTC
derivatives.
Figure 112

Derivatives are popular with financial and non-financial companies and with
certain individuals. Nearly all large companies use derivatives to protect themselves
from risks such as changes in commodity prices, interest rates, and foreign exchange
rates.13 A key use of derivatives is to transfer risk from someone who does not want
it to someone who is better able and more willing to bear the risk. Another important
role derivatives play is price discovery and liquidity: Derivatives provide

May 2014), http://mercatus.org/publication/securities-lending-and-untold-story-collapse-aig
(explaining the role that securities lending played in AIG’s crisis).
11
Acharya et al., supra note 7, at 239 (“[D]uring the current crisis, CDSs and other credit
derivatives have played a very important role in disseminating information to both the public
and to regulators. Due to the complexity of financial firms’ capital structures, it is difficult to
infer general credit quality from the secondary market in underlying bonds, especially given
that some of the bonds rarely trade. In contrast, from very early on during the financial crisis,
the CDS market has judged the quality of financial firm’s bankruptcy prospects in a
remarkably prescient way.”).
12
Detailed Tables on Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-December 2014,
BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.bis.org/statistics/derdetailed.htm.
13

See, e.g., News Release, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Over 94% of
the World’s Largest Companies Use Derivatives to Help manage their Risks, According to
ISDA Survey (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.isda.org/press/press042309der.pdf; see also
TUCKMAN, supra note 7; Edmund Parker & Geoffrey Parker, A History of Derivatives:
Ancient
Mesopotamia
to
Trading
Places,
YOUTUBE
(Dec.
17,
2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kd2pE5s33Qg (explaining the long history of derivatives).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

5

594

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:589

information about the products or financial instruments on which they are based and
can improve liquidity in the markets for those products or financial instruments.14
A. OTC Derivatives in a Changing Regulatory Landscape
OTC derivatives are widely used risk management tools because they can be
designed to precisely match a specific risk. By one measure, OTC derivatives were a
$600 trillion market in 2008.15 Thus, OTC derivatives understandably caught the
attention of post-crisis policymakers. More than seventy-five percent of OTC
derivatives are interest rate derivatives, just over sixteen percent are foreign
exchange derivatives, and approximately four percent are credit derivatives.16 OTC
derivatives are also often called swaps “because many OTC deals involve cash
flows, or obligations, that are swapped or exchanged between two parties at defined
intervals.”17 Before Dodd-Frank, OTC derivatives generally were bilaterally
executed and not centrally cleared. Clients interacted with dealers—usually big
banks—and these dealers entered into contracts with one another to shift risks
among themselves. This structure, pictured below, enabled firms to trade discreetly
and hedge their risks precisely, which brought risk management benefits and
favorable accounting treatment.18 Rapid innovation was possible in the OTC markets
as new products were designed in response to client needs and could be tested on a
small-scale.

14

Acharya et al., supra note 7, at 234.

15 $600 trillion is an attention-catching number, but some contend that representing the
size of the market by reference to the notional value is potentially misleading. See, e.g., Jon
Skinner, How Big is OTC Really?, OTC SPACE (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.theotcspace.com/2013/03/22/how-big-is-otc-really. Others point out the lack of a
direct link between the notional value of the market and its risk to the financial system. See,
e.g., Miguel A. Segoviano & Manmohan Singh, Counterparty Risk in the Over-the-Counter
Derivatives Market 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 08/258, Nov. 2008),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08258.pdf (“Notional amounts are defined
as the gross nominal value of all OTC derivative deals concluded and not yet settled on the
reporting date. These amounts provide a measure of the size of the market, but do not provide
a measure of risk.”).
16
OCC QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 3, at 10 (“Interest rate contracts continue to
represent the lion’s share of the derivatives market at 76.9% of total derivatives. FX and credit
derivatives are 16.7% and 4.3% of total notionals, respectively. Commodity and equity
derivatives collectively are only 2.1% of total notional derivatives.”).
17

Richard Heckinger et al., Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, in UNDERSTANDING
DERIVATIVES—MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 27 (2014).
18

Id. at 27-29 (discussing the reasons for using the OTC derivatives markets).
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Figure 219
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As a consequence of the dispersed, less standardized nature of the transactions,
regulators had less comprehensive insight into swaps markets than, for example, into
the futures market. Moreover, to provide legal clarity for the developing swaps
markets,20 in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”)
Congress deliberately exempted these over-the-counter transactions from most of the
requirements of the Commodity Exchange Act and securities laws.21 In so doing, the
CFMA provided legal certainty for these transactions, but exempted them from most
regulatory requirements applicable to futures contracts and securities.22 These
statutory exemptions, like the complex patchwork of prior regulatory exemptions on
which they were built, also provided incentives not to standardize or clear swaps
contracts.23

19

Author’s Rendering

20

See id. at 35-38 (providing a helpful chronology of OTC derivative regulation).

21 Swaps between eligible contract participants that were individually negotiated and not
executed on a trading facility were generally excluded from most provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § 2(g) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010). The justification for the exclusion was:

[R]egulation of such transactions under the [Commodity Exchange Act] was
unnecessary to achieve the act’s principal objectives of deterring market manipulation
and protecting investors. Such transactions are not readily susceptible to manipulation
and eligible counterparties can and should be expected to protect themselves against
fraud and counterparty credit losses. Exclusion of these transactions resolved longstanding concerns that a court might find that the CEA applied to these transactions,
thereby making them legally unenforceable.
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Patrick Parkinson, Deputy
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Although many observers blame the CFMA for creating a “regulatory black
hole,”24 there were other regulatory and market constraints in place. First, certain
antifraud laws continued to apply.25 Second, the participants in the OTC markets had
to meet threshold criteria designed to ensure these markets were open only to
sophisticated, institutional participants.26 Third, because large banks were and are
active OTC dealers,27 bank regulators monitored much of the market activity.28
Fourth, privately developed standards, including master agreements and other
standardized contract documentation developed by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”), governed key aspects of relationships between
swap dealers and their customers.29 Fifth, firms had taken steps to consolidate and
Dir., Div. of Research & Statistics), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/
2005/20050908/default.htm.
22 For a detailed analysis of the CFMA, see Memorandum from Cravath, Swain & Moore
to ISDA Members, Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (Jan. 5, 2001),
http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/analysis_of_commodity-exchange-act-legislation.pdf.
23 See, e.g., The Effective Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 164 (June 9, 2009)
(statement of Christian Johnson, Professor, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, Univ. of Utah) (“Until
recently, the U.S. regulatory structure effectively prevented clearing OTC derivatives” and
“even the [CFMA] left regulatory barriers to clearing OTC derivatives.”).
24 Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the SEC’s Roundtable
on Modernizing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Disclosure System (Oct. 8, 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch100808cc.htm; see also BETTER MKTS, THE COST
OF THE CRISIS: $20 TRILLION AND COUNTING (2015), http://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/
default/files/Better%20Markets%20-%20Cost%20of%20the%20Crisis.pdf
(“[I]n
2000,
Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act at the urging of financial industry
lobbyists, which effectively prohibited the regulation of derivatives. This statute tied
regulators’ hands and prevented them from engaging in any meaningful oversight, regulation,
or enforcement in the swaps derivatives markets.”).
25 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2) (2008), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010); Derivatives, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/doddfrank/derivatives.shtml (last modified May 5, 2015) (“The CFMA explicitly prohibited the
SEC and CFTC from regulating the over-the-counter (OTC) swaps markets, but provided the
SEC with antifraud authority over ‘security-based swap agreements,’ such as credit default
swaps.”).
26
Under the CFMA, the OTC market was limited to “eligible contract participants,”
which were generally financial institutions and nonfinancial entities meeting certain asset
thresholds. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12)(2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
27

See supra note 3.

28

See, e.g., COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 2 (1997) (“This guidance is intended to provide a
framework for evaluating the adequacy of risk management practices of derivative dealers and
end-users.”).
29
See, e.g., Christopher L. Culp, OTC-Cleared Derivatives: Benefits, Costs, and
Implications of the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” 20 J.
APPLIED FIN., 103, 108 (2010) (“[T]he use of master agreements provides contract language
that is generally accepted amongst OTC derivatives participants. The most popular such
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bring order to their derivatives positions through multilateral compression and the
tearing up of redundant contracts.30 Sixth, parties in these OTC transactions had
reason to choose their counterparties carefully and thereafter to monitor their
creditworthiness because, unless there was a subsequent overriding transaction, these
parties would remain in relationship with one another for the duration of the
contract. Finally, starting before the crisis, policymakers were working with market
participants on fortifying some of these market mechanisms for regulating
derivatives markets.31
After the crisis, there was an international effort to impose a new, more formal
regulatory structure on the OTC derivatives markets. The Group of Twenty (G-20)
nations, meeting after the crisis, made “[i]mproving over-the-counter derivatives
markets” a key element of their post-crisis regulatory reform plans:
All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges
or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through
central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts
should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts
should be subject to higher capital requirements.32

master agreements are the ISDA Master Agreements.”); Stephen H. Moller et al., Section
2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement and Emerging Swaps Jurisprudence in the Shadow of
Lehman Brothers, 7 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 313, 314 (2011) (“For over 20 years, overthe-counter swaps and other derivative contracts have been documented using the provisions
prescribed by the forms of standard terms documents and master agreements and the related
transaction architecture, all of which have been designed by ISDA.”); Frank Partnoy, SecondOrder Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169, 185-88 (2007) (discussing role of ISDA
as standard setter in OTC derivatives markets).
30

See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MEETING
NEW CHALLENGES TO STABILITY AND BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEM 93 (2010) [hereinafter IMF,
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT] (discussing pre-Dodd-Frank multilateral compression
and tear-up operations).
31

See, e.g., OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group, FED. RES. BANK N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html (last visited
Mar. 13, 2016) (“The OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group (ODSG) originated in 2005, when
the New York Fed hosted a meeting with representatives of major over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives market participants and their domestic and international supervisors, in order to
address the emerging risks of inadequate infrastructure for the rapidly growing market in
credit derivatives. The group is chaired by the New York Fed and meets annually with other
supervisors and signatories to a series of ‘commitment letters’. Commitments made by
signatories signify their collective agreement to work with other signatories and their
counterparties (whether signatories or not) to deliver structural improvements to the OTC
derivatives market across asset classes in the interest of financial stability.”); The Effective
Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market, supra note 23, at 164 (noting “the
good work that is being done in the credit default swap market as the regulators have nudged
participants to clean up the area and to try and reduce systemic risk”).
32
Leaders’ Statement at the Pittsburgh Summit, DEP’T TREASURY (Sept. 24-25, 2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_
leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
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The agreed-upon “improvements” represented an ambitious plan to remake a
massive market. The G20 agreement became the basis for ongoing reform efforts in
the United States, European Union, and Asia.
In the United States, the G-20 commitments took shape in Title VII of DoddFrank. This section, spanning more than 150 pages, introduced a complex new
regulatory structure for the OTC derivatives markets and participants in those
markets. Title VII buckets OTC derivatives into two main categories; swaps
regulated primarily by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and
security-based swaps regulated primarily by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).33 Most of the affected OTC derivatives are within the CFTC’s
jurisdiction.34 The new framework requires active market participants to register and
standardized OTC derivatives to be cleared, traded on an exchange or exchange-like
platform, reported to data repositories, and publicly reported. Implementation of
these interlinking pieces is a multi-year process with rolling deadlines for
registration, reporting, clearing, and trading, depending on the type of OTC
derivative and the type of market participant involved. Proponents look to the new
swaps framework to enhance financial stability, reduce complexity, increase
transparency, and foster competition.
The CFTC and SEC share most of the responsibility for writing Dodd-Frank’s
implementing rules. The two agencies are writing parallel, and sometimes
inconsistent,35 sets of rules governing the markets and market participants. Bank
regulators, as primary regulators for many market participants, also play a role,
including with respect to the important issues of setting margin and capital

33 The agencies share jurisdiction for a third category—“mixed swaps.” For simplicity
and because the vast majority of OTC derivatives covered by Title VII fall under CFTC
oversight, in this Article, the term “swap” is generally used interchangeably with “OTC
derivative” and includes both swaps and security-based swaps. Dodd-Frank broadly defined
“swaps” and “security-based swaps,” but directed the CFTC and SEC to define these terms
more precisely. 15 U.S.C. § 8302(d) (2012). Regulators deferred this task until after many of
the other Dodd-Frank rules were written, thus complicating efforts to understand how other
rules would work.
34

See, e.g., GIBSON DUNN, U.S. SEC IMPLEMENTS DODD-FRANK ACT TITLE VII: REPORTING
PUBLIC DISSEMINATION RULES FOR SECURITY-BASED SWAPS 1 (2015),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/SEC-Implements-Dodd-Frank-Title-VII-Reporting-and-Public-%20Dissemination-Rules--Security-Based-Swaps.pdf (“Under the DoddFrank Act, the CFTC has jurisdiction over foreign exchange, interest rate, and other commodity
derivatives, as well as credit default and equity derivatives based on indices, two or more loans, and
a broad-based (10 or more) group of securities. The SEC’s jurisdiction is limited to credit default
and equity derivatives based on a single security or loan or a narrow-based (9 or fewer) group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or the value thereof), or events relating to a single
issuer or issuers of securities in a narrow-based security index.”).

AND

35

See, e.g., id. at 17 (“Though Final Regulation SBSR provides a mechanism for
substituted compliance, the lack of harmonization between the CFTC and SEC rules, as well
as the rules of foreign jurisdictions, will only increase the complexity of the global reporting
landscape.”).
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requirements.36 Domestic regulations operate alongside, and sometimes in conflict
with, the international rules adopted under the G-20 principles.37
The Dodd-Frank Act swaps framework includes several key features. First, it
identifies the major market participants—“swap dealers” and “major swap
participants,”38 requires them to register with the CFTC or SEC,39 and subjects them
to certain business conduct requirements.40 Second, Dodd-Frank requires the CFTC
and SEC to identify OTC derivatives or categories that are subject to a clearing
mandate.41 In making these determinations, the agencies must consider factors such
as the size of the market, its liquidity, the availability of pricing data, the adequacy
of the infrastructure supporting the swap, systemic risk considerations, competitive
considerations, and legal certainty.42 Third, Dodd-Frank mandates these swaps—
except for those involving nonfinancial companies hedging their business risks—are
36 See, e.g., Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 Fed. Reg.
74839 (Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 45, 237, 349, 624 & 1221).
37

See FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS REFORMS: NINTH PROGRESS
REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION (2015), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/OTCDerivatives-Ninth-July-2015-Progress-Report.pdf. Both the SEC and CFTC have attempted to
define the extraterritorial reach of their rules. See, e.g., Interpretive Guidance and Policy
Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45292 (July
26, 2013); Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major-Security-Based Swap
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 47278
(Aug. 12, 2014); Application of Certain Title VII Requirements to Security-Based Swap
Transactions Connected with a Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity That Are Arranged,
Negotiated, or Executed By Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch
or Office of an Agent, 80 Fed. Reg. 27443 (May 13, 2015).
38

Dodd-Frank defines “swap dealers” and “major swap participants.” Dodd-Frank Act §
721 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a (2012)). A parallel provision defines “security-based swap
dealer” and “major security-based swap participant.” Id. at § 761 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a) (2012)). Dodd-Frank directs the CFTC and SEC to further define all of those terms and
“swap,” “security-based swap,” “eligible contract participant,” and “security-based swap
agreement.” id. § 712(d)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302 (2012)). These definitions are
important as they help to determine which transactions are subject to Dodd-Frank
requirements.
39

Id. § 731 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(a) (2012)) (providing for registration of swap
dealers and major swap participants); id. § 764 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10 (2012))
(providing for registration of security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap
participants).
40

Id. § 731 (adding 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)) (imposing business conduct requirements on swap
dealers and major swap participants ); id. § 764 (adding 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8(h)(3)) (imposing
business conduct requirements on security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap
participants).
41
Id. § 723(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2) (2012)) (directing the CFTC to determine
“on an ongoing basis” which swaps must be cleared); id. § 763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78c-3(b) (2012)) (directing the SEC to determine “on an ongoing basis” which security-based
swaps must be cleared).
42
Id. § 723(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2) (2012)) (setting forth clearing determination
factors for the CFTC); id. § 763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b) (2012)) (setting forth
clearing determination factors for the SEC).
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cleared at clearinghouses registered with the SEC or CFTC.43 Fourth, if a trading
venue is available, cleared swaps must trade on an exchange or a swap execution
facility (“SEF”)—a new type of trading venue created by Dodd-Frank for the swaps
markets.44 Fifth, Dodd-Frank rules prescribe how, when, and by whom cleared and
uncleared swap transactions must be reported to a swap data repository, another new
entity created under Dodd-Frank to house swap transaction data.45 Sixth, DoddFrank requires public transparency about swap transactions.46 Finally, Title VII
requires regulators to set capital and margin requirements in connection with cleared
and uncleared swaps.47 In bilateral transactions, collateral arrangements have been
flexible; for example, dealers and certain ostensibly “safe” clients did not have to
post collateral48 and dealers sometimes accepted illiquid assets as collateral.49
Therefore, the Title VII requirements mandating margin for uncleared transactions
are a meaningful change. The impact is likely to be particularly significant because
the statute directs regulators to set the capital and margin requirements for uncleared
swaps with the key objective of “offset[ing] the greater risk to the swap dealer or
major swap participant and the financial system arising from the use of swaps that

43 Id. § 723(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2012)) (establishing swaps clearing
requirement); id. § 763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3) (2012) (establishing security-based
swap clearing requirement).
44
Id. § 733 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7b-3 (2012)) (establishing swap execution facilities);
id. § 723(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(8) (2012)) (requiring trade execution for swaps); id. §
763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(h) (2012) (requiring trade execution for security-based
swaps made available to trade); id. § 763(c) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-4) (2012))
(establishing security-based swap execution facilities).
45

Id. §§ 727 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012)) (providing for swap data repository
registration and requiring that all swaps be reported to a registered repository); id. § 729
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6r (2012)) (requiring reporting for uncleared swaps); id. § 763(i)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(m), (n) (2012)) (providing for security-based swap data repository
registration and requiring that all security-based swaps be reported to a registered repository);
id. § 766 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m-1 (2012)) (requiring reporting for uncleared securitybased swaps).
46
Id. § 727 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012)) (requiring public reporting of swap
transaction data); id. § 763(i) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2012)) (requiring public
reporting of security-based swap transaction data).
47

Id. § 731 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e) (2012)) (providing for capital and margin
requirements for swaps); id. § 764 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8(e) (2012)) (providing for
capital and margin requirements for security-based swaps).
48
See, e.g., Manmohan Singh, Collateral, Netting and Systemic Risk in the OTC
Derivatives Market 5-6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 10/99, 2010),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=23741.0.
49 See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case
Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 649 (2010) (observing that in
certain bilateral transactions with end-users, dealers may “take unsecured risk . . . or may
accept illiquid collateral, for example, business assets, to secure potential counterparty
exposure.”).
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are not cleared.”50 This requirement hints at the value Dodd-Frank’s drafters placed
on central clearing—the subject of the next section of this Article.
B. What Clearinghouses Do
Mandated central clearing is a key aspect of the G-20 reform plan and, of the
Dodd-Frank reform plan for derivatives. Policymakers, shaken by the large bilateral
derivatives exposures that came into focus during the crisis, sought to take risk out
of individual firms and house it in solidly managed and well-regulated
clearinghouses.51 Proponents of central clearing argue this arrangement reduces
systemic risk by limiting big financial institutions’ exposures to one another and
replacing them with exposures to safe CCPs.52 Advocates also point to the value of
central clearing in enhancing transparency, introducing margin uniformity and
discipline, mutualizing losses, and limiting the need for market participants to
monitor one another.53 If a member defaults, a properly functioning CCP can move
clients of the defaulting firm to new counterparties with relative ease. Moreover, as
one observer has noted, CCPs serve a valuable role in speeding payments to a subset
of a failed clearing member’s creditors without slowing payments to others.54
Clearinghouses have existed for centuries in different contexts. In essence, as Ed
Nosal of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago explains, clearing is “a set of
50 Dodd-Frank Act § 731(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e)(3)(A) (2012)); see also id. § 764(a)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(e)(3)(A) (2012)) (comparable provision for security-based
swaps). Former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner explained the rationale for stringent
uncleared margin requirements:

Imposing appropriate margin requirements on uncleared swaps will also help create
incentives for market participants to use centralized clearing and standardized
contracts so that they do not needlessly externalize risks to the financial system by
avoiding central clearing. New margin requirements will also mitigate the increased
risks presented by derivatives that are appropriately executed outside of central
clearing, and therefore do not benefit from the protections of a central counterparty.
Timothy Geithner, Secretary, Dept’t of Treasury, Remarks to the International Monetary
Conference
(June
6,
2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1202.aspx.
51 See, e.g., Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner Written Testimony Before the Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Hearing on OTC Derivatives Reform and
Addressing Systemic Risk, DEP’T TREASURY (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tg425.aspx (“With careful supervision and regulation of the
margin and other risk management practices of clearinghouses, central clearing of a
substantial proportion of OTC derivatives should help to reduce risks arising from the web of
bilateral interconnections among our major financial institutions. This should reduce the
prospect of threats to financial stability emerging from the derivative markets.”).
52 See, e.g., Michael Greenberger, Diversifying Clearinghouse Ownership in Order to
Safeguard Free and Open Access to the Derivatives Clearing Market, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP &
FIN. L. 245, 249 (2013) (explaining the role that CCPs play in eliminating counterparty risk).
53

See, e.g., Janet L. Yellen, Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons from the
Financial Crisis and Policy Implications, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. 15, 16 (Jan. 4,
2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Yellen20130104a.pdf.
54
See generally Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 857 (2014).
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institutional arrangements that are designed to enhance contractual performance.”55
Clearinghouses ensure that each side of the trade gets what the other side has
promised it. In the United States, clearinghouses have long served the equities,
options, futures, and fixed income markets.56 However, their active presence in the
OTC derivatives markets is more recent. Clearinghouses provide a range of postexecution services, including matching trades, confirming the terms of the
transaction, netting, and settling trades.57 Of particular importance, if a firm has
multiple positions with a clearinghouse, positions and associated margin are netted,
which allows for offsetting positions to cancel one another out.58
Some clearinghouses, including the ones at issue in this Article, also serve as
CCPs.59 Once a trade is executed, a CCP steps in as buyer for every seller and seller
for every buyer. The original contract is novated,60 which means it disappears and is
replaced by two contracts with the CCP. Each party subsequently interacts only with
the CCP. The CCP collects collateral from each party to protect itself. A key feature
of CCPs is loss mutualization—if a party defaults and losses exceed the collateral
provided by that party, all of the clearing members share any resulting losses. The
following diagram models a CCP, its members, their clients, the settlement banks
through which payments are made, and a second CCP with which the first CCP—
most likely through shared clearing members—might also be connected.
55

Ed Nosal & Robert Steigerwald, What Is Clearing and Why Is It Important?, CHI. FED.
LETTER, NO. 278, Sept. 2010, at 3.
56 For a concise history of clearinghouses in the United States, see Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Fed. Res., Clearinghouses, Financial Stability, and Financial Reform, Speech at the
2011 Financial Markets Conference (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20110404a.htm. In the United States equities and options
markets, the CCP can be separate from the trading venue; a market participant can trade in one
venue and clear the trade in another venue. In the futures markets, trading and clearing venues
have typically been linked; trades executed on an exchange clear through the exchange’s
clearing venue. Felix B. Chang, The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks and Clearinghouses
Under Regulation, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 747, 767-70.
57 See, e.g., Raymond Knott & Alastair Mills, Modelling Risk in Central Counterparty
Clearing Houses: A Review, FIN. STABILITY REV., Dec. 2002, at 162 n.2. These services need
not be provided by a CCP. See, e.g., Elisabeth Ledrut & Christian Upper, Clearing PostTrading Arrangements for OTC Derivatives, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2007, at 92 (“Given that CCP
services have been limited to a restricted set of contracts, market participants have explored
other avenues to obtain some of the benefits of CCPs [including] centralization of information
or multilateral netting . . . .”).
58

See, e.g., Robert R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and
Settlement: A Comparison of Central Counterparties and Alternate Structures, 30 ECON.
PERSP. 22, 26 (2006) (describing netting).
59 In this article, “CCP” and “clearinghouse” are generally used interchangeably. CFTCregistered clearinghouses are “derivatives clearing organizations” (“DCOs”). SEC-registered
clearinghouses are “clearing agencies.” Those terms are also used. For a thorough introduction
to CCPs, see JON GREGORY, CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES: MANDATORY CENTRAL CLEARING
AND INITIAL MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR OTC DERIVATIVES 236 (2014).
60
See Robert S. Steigerwald, Central Counterparty Clearing, in UNDERSTANDING
DERIVATIVES—MARKETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 18-20 (2013). An alternative to novation is an
“open offer” system, in which the counterparties enter into a contract directly with the CCP.
Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 58, at 28 n.11.
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Figure 361
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Because each original party to the transaction is left with a contract with the
CCP, for the remainder of the contract, the buyer and seller no longer have to worry
about the other’s creditworthiness.62 The creditworthiness of the new counterparty—
the clearinghouse—is all that matters, and—the assumption goes—the CCP ensures
“minimal, near-zero counterparty risk.”63 In this way, a clearinghouse can protect
large financial firms from one another by putting itself in between them. As
Professor Adam Levitin explains, “[b]y separating counterparty risk from position
risk in swaps transactions, the clearinghouse serves as a systemic-risk circuit breaker
. . . .”64 During the last crisis, financial institutions rushed to get out of derivatives
61

Author’s rendering.

62

To say that clearing members have no need to worry may be too strong; if the CCP
properly allocates losses among members, a problem at any counterparty to the CCP can
expose every other counterparty to the CCP to losses. See Bob Hills et al., Central
Counterparty Clearing Houses and Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY REV. June 1999, at 128
(“Ideally the central counterparty should be structured in a way that gives market participants
a continuing interest in the credit quality of the entities with which they trade and in the
central counterparty’s ability to monitor and control its credit risk.”).
63 Viral V. Acharya et al., Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives, in RESTORING
FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 251 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew
Richardson eds., 2011).
64
Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101
GEO. L.J. 445, 453 (2013).
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contracts with weakening counterparties by interposing safer counterparties; a CCP
would eliminate the need to run from failing counterparties.65
Because clearinghouses collect risk from the market, how they manage that risk
is of great importance. A key component of risk management is the CCP’s balanced
book: The contract the CCP enters into with the original seller is offset exactly by
the contract it enters into with the original buyer. This balance generally means that
the CCP is protected from market risk, provided neither counterparty defaults on its
obligations to the CCP. Because members do not always meet their obligations,
however, CCPs employ other mechanisms to manage risks deriving from the
members and the products they clear.
Clearing members (also known as clearing participants) have to meet the CCP’s
threshold requirements. These requirements may include indicia of financial
strength, operational capabilities, and effective risk management.66 In addition,
clearing members have to open an account with at least one of the CCP’s settlement
banks, through which a clearing member satisfies its financial obligations (such as
paying variation margin) to the CCP.67 CCPs monitor their members and may
impose risk-specific restrictions on them—including position limits—to prevent
overexposure to any particular firm.68 Upon joining a CCP, each member contributes
to a guaranty (or default) fund, which can be drawn on if one or more members

65

For a discussion of this benefit, see Beylin, supra note 5, at 49.

66 See,
e.g.,
CHI.
MERCANTILE
EXCHANGE,
RULEBOOK
Rule
901,
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CME/I/9/9.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (setting forth
requirements for clearing members); ICE CLEAR CREDIT, CLEARING RULES Rule 201 (2015),
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/ICE_Clear_Credit_Rules.pdf (setting forth
requirements for clearing participants).
67

John W. McPartland, Clearing and Settlement of Exchange Traded Derivatives, CHI.
FED LETTER, No. 267, Oct. 2009, at 2-3.
68
See,
e.g.,
CHI.
MERCANTILE
EXCHANGE,
RULEBOOK
Rule
8F010,
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CME/I/8F/8F.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (“[I]f the
Clearing House determines in good faith that, based on the exercise of prudent risk
management standards, that [sic] an OTC Clearing Member poses undue risk to the Clearing
House based on its OTC Derivatives portfolio, the Clearing House may take any or all of the
following actions with respect to such OTC Clearing Member: 1) impose an additional
performance bond requirement; 2) prohibit the addition of any new OTC Derivative positions,
or 3) require the reduction or unwinding of OTC Derivatives positions.”); ICE CLEAR CREDIT,
supra note 66, at Rule 203(b) ("[F]or the protection of ICE Clear Credit and the Participants,
ICE Clear Credit shall be authorized: (i) to impose such additional capital, Margin or other
requirements on a Participant; (ii) to allow such Participant to submit Trades for liquidation
only; (iii) to limit or restrict the type of Contracts that may be cleared by such Participant in
any of its accounts with ICE Clear Credit; or (iv) to limit or restrict the aggregate notional or
other reference amount of positions in Contracts that are permitted to be maintained by such
Participant in any of its accounts with ICE Clear Credit.”).
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default and the defaulter’s collateral proves inadequate.69 A clearing member’s
contribution can be adjusted to reflect the risk posed by that member to the CCP.70
A firm that wants to or must clear its trades, but is not eligible to become a
member of a CCP or chooses not to incur the cost, must clear through a clearing
member. Because the burdens of CCP membership are high,71 most swap market
participants prefer indirect access through a clearing member or—even more
indirectly—through a clearing member’s client.72 Few clearing members, however,
offer client clearing, a development that may constrain the ability of market
participants to trade derivatives subject to the clearing mandate.73 Even swap dealers
may not choose to become clearing members.74
CCPs protect themselves by carefully choosing products for clearing. CCPs
assess the risk profile of an asset class or product before accepting it for clearing.75
They use models to determine how to protect themselves from the risks associated
with clearing these products. These models take into account such factors as how
prices have moved over time and how one product might interact with other products
cleared by the CCP.
Collecting initial margin, which is essentially collateral, is a key way that CCPs
protect themselves. As the Clearing Timeline below shows, when a contract is first
cleared, the CCP collects from the clearing member initial margin (also known as a
69 GREGORY, supra note 59, at 31 (explaining that a key to the CCP “loss mutualisation”
model is the requirement that “all members pay into [a] default fund [and thus] all contribute
to absorbing an extreme default loss”).
70
IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 30, at 107 (“Guarantee fund
contributions should be related to the CM’s market position and the nature of its exposures
and be reevaluated regularly.”).
71

See, e.g., Jo Braithwaite, Legal Perspectives on Client Clearing 9 (LSE Legal Studies
Working
Paper
No.
14/2015,
2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629193 (“The membership criteria for clearing services for OTC
derivatives are onerous, even by the standards of other clearing services. This is because a
CCP faces more risk clearing OTC derivatives, which have very high values and long
maturities compared to other cleared contracts (e.g., for commodities), while the operational
complexities involved in clearing OTC derivatives are also far greater.”); see also Joe
Rennison, Nomura Exits Swaps Clearing for US and European Customers, FIN. TIMES (May
12, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e1883676-f896-11e4-be00-00144feab7de.html
#axzz3hVR1yzZe. For an estimate of the costs of clearing, see Beylin, supra note 5, at 46. As
Beylin points out, clearing indirectly is costly too. Id.
72

See GREGORY, supra note 59, at 136 (explaining that some market participants,
“particularly buy side and smaller financial institutions” either may not be eligible for
membership or “may find the indirect clearing route more efficient”).
73

See Arshadur Rahman, Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, Central Clearing and
Financial Stability, 55 BANK ENGLAND Q. BULL. 283, 290 (2015) (“[T]here are a relatively
small number of clearing members for these CCPs, and fewer still that offer client clearing.
Those clearing members that do offer client clearing become more important within the
system because non-clearing member firms would otherwise be unable to access central
clearing, hindering their ability to undertake OTC derivatives transactions (especially if these
contracts become subject to the clearing obligation).”) (internal citation omitted).
74

Beylin, supra note 5, at 19 n.45.

75

See GREGORY, supra note 59, at 236-37.
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performance bond)—typically in the form of cash or other liquid assets, such as
Treasury securities or gold.76 The CCP adjusts the initial margin periodically over
the term of the contract. Initial margin is designed to protect the CCP from most
potential future losses should the member default leaving the CCP to wind down the
defaulter’s portfolio.77 It “is designed to cover the worst-case close out costs (due to
the need to find replacement transactions) in the event a member defaults.”78 The
CCP uses models, assumptions, and historical data to set initial margin. An initial
margin reflects—among other things—the historical price volatility of the product
and is in proportion to the clearing member’s net or gross position in that product.79
Initial margin should be sufficient to allow the CCP the time it needs to terminate the
relevant position if the clearing member defaults.80 In setting an initial margin,
regulators and market participants strive to cover all but the most extreme loss
scenarios.81 CCPs rely on complex models to achieve the targeted level of
coverage.82 As Knott and Mills explain, the “challenge faced by CCPs is to set initial
76 For a discussion of initial margin, see FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 424,
POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 6-7 (2010)
[hereinafter POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET]; GREGORY, supra note 59,
at 137.
77 See, e.g., Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 58, at 25 (“Margining systems are designed
to ensure that in the event that a clearing member fails to meet a margin call, sufficient funds
remain readily available to close out the member’s positions without loss to the CCP in most
market conditions.”); COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L
ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 52 (Apr.
2012), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf [hereinafter CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES] (“A
CCP should adopt initial margin models and parameters that are risk-based and generate
margin requirements that are sufficient to cover its potential future exposures to participants in
the interval between the last margin collection and the close out of positions following a
participant default.”).
78

GREGORY, supra note 59, at 30.

79

See McPartland, supra note 67, at 2; see also WALLACE C. TURBEVILLE, DERIVATIVES
CLEARINGHOUSES IN THE ERA OF FINANCIAL REFORM 9-12 (2010), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/
wp-content/uploads/2010/12/derivatives_clearinghouses_in_the_era_of_financial_reform.pdf.
80

POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET, supra note 76, at 7.

81

See, e.g., CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 52 (calling for a confidence level of
“at least ninety-nine percent with respect to the estimated distribution of future exposure”); Stan
Ivanov & Lee Underwood, CDS Clearing at ICE: A Unique Methodology, FUTURES INDUSTRY,
Nov. 2011, at 33, https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/FIA_magazine_CDS_risk_
management_article.pdf (“Because it can take several days for the market to absorb the shock of
default in an OTC market such as such as CDS, the ICE CDS risk methodology has adopted a fiveday risk horizon at a risk quantile of 99%. This means that margins are set to cover five days of
adverse price/credit spread movements for the portfolio positions with a confidence level of 99%.”);
CCP
RISK
MANAGEMENT,
RECOVERY
&
RESOLUTION
12,
LCH.CLEARNET,
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762448/final+white+paper+version+three.pdf/1d17
00aa-a1ae-4a6c-8f6f-541eec9b7420 (“Dodd-Frank rules . . . require a minimum 99% confidence
level for all products. In Europe, EMIR [European Market Infrastructure Regulation] requirements
go further, with a minimum . . . 99.5% for OTC derivatives. LCH.Clearnet has chosen . . . to apply
a confidence level of 99.7% across all our products.”).
82
To get a sense of the complexity of the margin analysis, see Ben Larah, CCP Margin
Models: Comparing Historic VaR and SPAN, OTC SPACE (June 6, 2013),
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margin at a level sufficient to provide protection against all but the most extreme
price moves, but not so high as to damage market liquidity or discourage use of the
CCP.”83
Another way the CCP protects itself is by daily (or more frequently) collecting
cash variation margin (also known as mark-to-market margin) from clearing
members. Variation margin reflects daily changes in the market value of clearing
members’ portfolios.84 Thus, whereas initial margin is collateral for the purpose of
protecting the CCP against potential future exposures, variation margin is a payment
that transfers actual market gains and losses between the CCP and its counterparties
typically within a day of their occurrence.85
Figure 486

Execution of
Transaction at
Swaps
Execution
Facility





Clearing Timeline

Clearing:
Match Terms
Novate Contract:
Replace existing
contract with 2 new
contracts
Initial Margin

Settlement
of
Transaction

 Daily or Intra-day Marking Position to Market
and Payment of Variation Margin
 Periodic Adjustments of Initial Margin

As noted earlier, many firms are not direct CCP members. The clearing members
through whom these firms clear are responsible for managing their customers’ risk,
guaranteeing their customers’ contract performance, and collecting and passing on to
the clearinghouse initial and variation margin for their customers.87 The CCP
http://www.theotcspace.com/2013/06/06/ccp-margin-models-comparing-historic-var-andspan.
83

Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 166.

84

See, e.g., CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 54.

85

Compare 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ccc) (2016) (defining “initial margin” as “money, securities,
or property posted by a party to a futures, option, or swap as performance bond to cover
potential future exposures arising from changes in the market value of the position”), with id.
§ 1.3(fff) (defining “variation margin” as “a payment made by a party to a futures, option, or
swap to cover the current exposure arising from changes in the market value of the position
since the trade was executed or the previous time the position was marked to market”).
86

Author’s rendering.

87

For a discussion of client clearing, see GREGORY, supra note 59, at 127-29.
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maintains customer collateral separately from the clearing member’s proprietary (or
house) collateral.88 If the clearing member defaults, this collateral segregation
protects customers and facilitates moving customer trades to other clearing members.
One of the key jobs of a CCP is to protect itself against and plan for member and
customer defaults. A default destabilizes the CCP’s normally matched book,
pursuant to which there is one clearing member on one side of a trade and another
clearing member on the other side of the trade. Planning for defaults requires
considering operational, legal, and moral hazard issues, among others.89 After a
default, the CCP has to dispose of the defaulting member’s own positions at the CCP
and move customer positions and associated collateral.90 The CCP must have enough
available liquidity to meet all of its cash payout requirements during the default
period.91 To staunch immediate losses, the CCP can hedge some or all of the
defaulting firm’s portfolio with new positions in the market.92 The CCP may opt to
enter into offsetting positions, auction off the defaulting firm’s positions, allocate
them to non-defaulting clearing members, or tear up the offsetting transactions. The
CCP may require members to participate in auctions, may open the auction to nonmembers, and may provide inducements to bid in the auction.93 A CCP may borrow
personnel—including traders with relevant expertise—from the clearing members to
form a committee to assist CCP personnel managing a default. Given the
complexities of managing a default, CCPs conduct dry runs of default processes to
prepare members and CCP staff in advance.94
88

See id. at 223-26 (discussing separation of client and clearing member accounts at

CCP).
89 For an insightful discussion of the complexities of the default processes and preparing
for a default, see generally Transcript of CFTC Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting
(Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/mrac_
040215_transcript.pdf.
90 See JASON QUARRY ET AL., OTC DERIVATIVES CLEARING: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2012),
http://www.oliverwyman.com/media/OTC_Derivatives_Clearing.pdf (showing that Lehman
default was managed without making it past Lehman’s initial margin in the default waterfall);
Natasha de Terán, How the World’s Largest Default Was Unravelled, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 13,
2008), http://www.swapclear.com/Images/Lehman%202008%20Financial%20News_tcm1459521.pdf (discussing how LCH.Clearnet managed the Lehman default, which included a
swaps portfolio).
91

See, e.g., Transcript of CFTC Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note
89, at 20 (statement of Ian Springle, ICE Clear Credit) (explaining that “part of our
preparations are making sure that we have sufficient liquid resources to meet our daily cash
payouts required during a default”).
92 For a default management timeline, see INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., ICE CLEAR CREDIT:
PREPARATIONS FOR A POTENTIAL CLEARING PARTICIPANT DEFAULT 5 (2015),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/mrac040215presentations
_ice.pdf.
93 CME
GROUP
INC.,
CME
DEFAULT
MANAGEMENT
3,
6
(2015),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/mrac040215presentations
_cme.pdf.
94

Id. at 5-7; INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., supra note 92, at 7-8.
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The defaulting member’s initial margin should cover CCP losses during the
default management process. If it does not, the CCP proceeds down a so-called
default waterfall to absorb any remaining losses. A default waterfall typically
includes the defaulter’s margin, its contributions to the guaranty fund, non-defaulting
members’ contributions to the guaranty fund, and a contribution from the CCP itself.
If the losses outstrip these resources, the CCP moves to the unfunded part of the
waterfall by imposing additional losses on non-defaulting members through
assessments for additional contributions or haircuts on non-defaulters’ margin. If a
clearing member’s customer defaults, other customers’ collateral typically is not
applied to cover losses.95 Under international guidelines, systemically important
CCPs are supposed to be prepared to handle the simultaneous default of their two
largest clearing members and their affiliates (the so-called “Cover 2” standard).96
The following table shows the waterfalls employed by several large OTC
derivative CCPs in the event of a member default. The CCPs turn to the sources
listed below in descending order.
Table 1: Default Waterfalls97
CME OTC IRS

CME OTC CDS

ICE Clear
Credit—CDS

LCH Clearnet–
OTC IRS

EurexOTC Clear

Defaulted clearing
member’s IRS
fund performance
bonds

Defaulted
clearing
member’s CDS
fund performance
bonds

Defaulted clearing
member’s margin

Defaulted clearing
member margin

Defaulted clearing
member margin

Defaulted clearing
member’s IRS
guaranty fund
contribution

Defaulted
clearing
member’s CDS
guaranty fund
contribution

Defaulted clearing
member’s
guaranty fund
contribution

Defaulter’s
default fund
contribution

Defaulted clearing
member clearing
fund contribution

95

See GREGORY, supra note 59, at 223-36 (discussing the CFTC’s “legally segregated
operationally commingled (LSOC)” approach for protecting clearing members’ customers
from one another).
96

CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 36 (“[A] CCP that is involved in activities
with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions
should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential
stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants
and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the
CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.”).
97

Cleared OTC Financial Products, CME GRP., www.cmegroup.com/trading/otc/clearedotc-initiatives.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2016); INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., supra note 92, at 3;
Transcript of CFTC Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 89, (statement of
Ian Springle, ICE Clear Credit); Risk Management Overview, LCH.CLEARNET,
www.lchclearnet.com/risk-collateral-management/risk-management-overview (last visited
Apr. 23, 2016); EUREX CLEARING, EUREXOTC CLEAR FOR IRS—EMIR (2014),
http://www.eurexclearing.com/blob/305764/5913f4c9d5a51ed47e59d3a63f21c62b/
data/eurex_otc_clear_services.pdf; ICE Clear U.S.: Regulation, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH.,
https://www.theice.com/clear-us/regulation (last visited Apr. 23, 2016).
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CME OTC IRS

CME OTC CDS

$150 M. CME
designated
working capital
for IRS guaranty
fund
Non-defaulted
clearing members
IRS guaranty fund
contributions

$50 M. CME
designated
working capital
for CDS guaranty
fund
Non-defaulted
clearing members
CDS guaranty
fund contribution

Assessment
Powers (to cover
3rd and 4th
largest clearing
member
shortfalls)

Assessment
powers (to cover
3rd and 4th
largest clearing
member
shortfalls)
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ICE Clear
Credit—CDS
Defaulted member
specific wrongway risk guaranty
fund component
(if applicable)
$50 M. ICE
contribution98

LCH Clearnet–
OTC IRS
$2 M. LCH.
Clearnet LLC
capital

EurexOTC Clear

$260 M.
SwapClear USDomiciled service
default fund

Clearing fund
contributions of
other members

Non-defaulted
clearing members’
guaranty fund
contributions/ ICE
Pro Rata guaranty
fund contribution

Unfunded
contributions –
Assessments

Assessment to the
clearing fund

Assessments of
non-defaulted
clearing members

Service continuity
- variation margin
haircutting

Parental guaranty

Service closure

Remaining equity
of Eurex clearing
AG

EUR 50 M EUR
Dedicated amount
of Eurex Clearing
AG

The default waterfall exposes members to potential losses from the risks taken by
other members. This feature of CCPs is designed to inspire members to monitor one
another and the way the CCP manages risks.99 As the next section discusses,
regulators also actively regulate and monitor CCPs.
C. How Swap Clearinghouses Are Regulated
Having placed clearinghouses at the center of OTC derivatives reform, United
States and international regulators are engaged in an ongoing effort to rethink the
way they regulate CCPs. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke put it this
way: “As Mark Twain’s character Pudd’nhead Wilson once opined, if you put all
your eggs in one basket, you better watch that basket.”100 Titles VII and VIII of
Dodd-Frank, which address numerous aspects of CCPs, are a central part of that
effort. In the five years since Dodd-Frank became law, regulators’ focus on CCPs
has grown as they have begun to ponder the potential consequences of a CCP failure.
98

This contribution is in two distinct parts: “The 10 first one is the $25 million ICE
priority contribution, which we use before the nondefaulters’ funding, guaranty fund. We also
have a pro rata $25 million contribution, which we use prorated during the consumption of the
nondefaulters, guaranty fund.” Transcript of CFTC Market Risk Advisory Committee
Meeting, supra note 89, at 28 (statement of Ian Springle, ICE Clear Credit).
99 See, e.g., Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 172 (“[M]embers residual exposure to the
uncovered losses of the CCP . . . creates an incentive for clearing members to take an active
interest in the overall standard of a CCP’s risk management.”).
100

Bernanke, supra note 56.
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A key feature of the regulatory scheme for OTC derivatives is the registration
and attendant regulation of CCPs. Clearinghouses that clear swaps must register with
the CFTC as derivative clearing organizations (DCOs).101 Clearinghouses that clear
security-based swaps must register with the SEC as clearing agencies.102 The statute
allows the CFTC and SEC to exempt from registration CCPs that are supervised by
the other commission or a foreign regulator.103 DCOs and clearing agencies existed
before Dodd-Frank to clear exchange-traded derivatives and securities, so DoddFrank did not have to create an entirely new regulatory framework for these entities.
Under both statutory regimes, CCPs are self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”),
which means that—subject to oversight by the relevant commission—they are able
to write and enforce rules applicable to their members. Clearing agencies are
arguably subject to more exacting oversight than DCOs because of the statutory
process by which rules are reviewed.104 DCOs may seek prior CFTC approval105 or
may simply self-certify to the CFTC that their rules comply with the Commodity
Exchange Act.106 The CFTC may intervene before the rule takes effect and can
disapprove a rule filing if the CFTC finds that the rule would violate the Commodity
Exchange Act.107 By contrast, the SEC routinely reviews and approves substantive
clearing agency rule filings.108 Additionally, both agencies retain some leverage over
CCP rules by virtue of the need for CCPs not to alienate their regulators.

101

Dodd-Frank Act § 725(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2012)).

102

Id. § 763(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(g) (2012)). Entities providing clearing
services for securities must register with the SEC under, and meet the requirements set forth
in, section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b)) and
rule 17Ab2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ab2-1 (2016).
103

Dodd-Frank Act § 725(b) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(h) (2012)) (authorizing CFTC to
exempt comparably supervised CCPs); id. § 763(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(k) (2012))
(authorizing SEC to exempt comparably supervised CCPs).
104

See, e.g., CFTC & SEC, A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND CFTC ON HARMONIZATION
REGULATION 27-32 (2009) (comparing and analyzing the relative merits of the CFTC and
SEC procedures for SRO rule filings); Derek Fischer, Note, Dodd-Frank’s Failure to Address
CFTC Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organization Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 69, 89-93
(2015) (arguing that the SEC’s standard of reviewing SRO rulemaking has more teeth than the
CFTC’s).

OF

105

7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(2) (2012).

106
Id. § 7a-2(c)(1) (2012) (“[A DCO] may elect to approve and implement any new rule or
rule amendment, by providing to the Commission . . . a written certification that the . . . new
rule, or rule amendment complies with this chapter (including regulations under this
chapter).”); 17 C.F.R. § 40.6 (2016) (setting forth self-certification process). For an example
of a self-certification filing, see Letter from Julian Oliver, Chief Compliance Officer,
LCH.Clearnet Ltd., to Christopher Kirkpatrick, CFTC (July 15, 2015),
http://www.cftc.gov/filings/orgrules/rule071615lchltddco001.pdf.
107

7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(2) & (5) (2012).

108

Securities Exchange Act § 19(b)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2012))
(generally requiring SROs to file rule amendments with the SEC and the SEC to publish them
for comment and consider whether to approve them); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2016) (setting
forth procedures for proposed rule changes by SROs).
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Dodd-Frank modified the existing regulatory structure for CCPs in a number of
ways. First, Congress authorized the CFTC and SEC to write tailored rules for swaps
CCPs.109 Second, the statute directs the commissions to write rules governing
conflicts of interest at CCPs if “necessary or appropriate to improve the governance
of, or to mitigate systemic risk, promote competition, or mitigate conflicts of
interest.”110 Third, Title VII prescribes an “open access” model for swaps CCPs
pursuant to which they must accept swaps for clearing, regardless of where the
transactions are executed.111 Open access stands in contrast with the futures model in
which DCOs are linked with a particular exchange. Fourth, Title VII includes a
modified and expanded set of “core principles” for DCOs.112 These core principles
are intended to be guiding principles that afford DCOs “reasonable discretion” in
compliance.113 There are eighteen principles covering topics including; financial
resources, participant and product eligibility, risk management, settlement
procedures, default rules and procedures, rule enforcement, system safeguards,
reporting, recordkeeping, public disclosure, antitrust, and governance.114 Even
though most of these topics were covered in the pre-Dodd-Frank core principles
under the Commodity Exchange Act, Dodd-Frank expanded many to include more
prescriptive detail.115 Fifth, Dodd-Frank requires each CCP to have a chief
compliance officer.116
109

Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012)) (requiring
DCOs to adhere to rules imposed by the CFTC pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5)); id. § 763(b)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(i), (j) (2012)) (authorizing the SEC to write security-based
swap clearing agency standards).
110 Id. § 726 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8323 (2012)) (directing the CFTC to review the need
for and adopt conflict-mitigating rules); id. § 765 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8343 (2012))
(providing a parallel provision to SEC); see also id. § 725(d) (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §
7a-1 note (2012)) (“[Directing the CFTC to] adopt rules mitigating conflicts of interest in
connection with the conduct of business by a swap dealer or a major swap participant with a
[swaps DCO] in which the swap dealer or major swap participant has a material debt or
material equity investment.”). Congress considered limits on control and voting rights as a
way to prevent large dealers from becoming too influential at CCPs. The statutory authority
offers the agencies more leeway than the controversial Lynch Amendment would have. Its
sponsor, Congressman Stephen Lynch, argued that proposed amendment would have
“prevent[ed] those big banks and major swap participants, like AIG, from taking over the
police station—these new clearinghouses . . . by limiting to a 20 percent voting stake the
ownership interest in those banks and the governance of the clearing and trading facilities.”
155 CONG. REC. 14711 (2009) (statement of Rep. Lynch).
111 Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(C)(iii)(III) (2012))
(requiring that DCO provide “fair and open access”); id. § 763 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c3(a)(2)(B) (2012)) (requiring that clearing agency must “provide for non-discriminatory
clearing of a security-based swap executed bilaterally or on or through the rules of an
unaffiliated national securities exchange or security-based swap execution facility”).
112

Id. § 725(c) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2) (2012)).

113

7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(A)(ii)) (2012).

114

Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2) (2012)).

115

For example, compare 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(D)(i) (2012) (requiring DCOs to ensure
that they “possess[ ] the ability to manage the risks associated with discharging the
responsibilities of the DCO through the use of appropriate tools and procedures” and setting
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The final component of the Dodd-Frank changes for CCPs is in Title VIII of
Dodd-Frank, which posits a more stringent regulatory regime for systemically
important CCPs. Title VIII’s focus on risk management was a natural response to the
enhanced role CCPs would play under the new regulatory framework. Congress
prefaced the title with the finding that financial market utilities (“FMUs”) “may
reduce risks for their participants and the broader financial system, but such utilities
may also concentrate and create new risks” and thus enhanced regulation was
warranted.117 Under Title VIII, the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(“FSOC”)—a conclave drawn from other financial regulators—may designate
systemically important FMUs (and those likely to become systemically important)
for additional regulatory oversight.118 FSOC has designated eight FMUs, including
two swaps CCPs.119
Title VIII charges the SEC and CFTC with writing and enforcing heightened risk
management standards for designated CCPs and gives the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”) a back-up regulatory role.120 These
standards are for “promot[ing] risk management [and] safety and soundness,”
“reduc[ing] systemic risks,” and “support[ing] the stability of the broader financial
system.”121 The statute mentions a number of specific risk management areas,
including margin and default procedures, but allows the regulators wide latitude to
write standards covering other areas.122 A designated CCP must seek pre-approval
from its regulator for changes in rules, procedures and operations that would
“materially affect, the nature or level of risks presented by” the CCP.123

forth prescriptions for four risk management areas), with 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(a)(2)(D) (2006),
amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (requiring DCOs to have “the ability
to manage the risks associated with discharging the responsibilities of a derivatives clearing
organization through the use of appropriate tools and procedures”).
116 Dodd-Frank Act § 725(b) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(i) (2012)) (requiring DCOs to
designate a chief compliance officer); id. § 763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(j) (2012))
(requiring clearing agencies to designate a chief compliance officer).
117

Id. § 802(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5461(a) (2012)).

118

Dodd-Frank Act § 804 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5463 (2012)). For a general overview of
Title VIII, see Norbert J. Michel, Financial Market Utilities: One More Dangerous Concept in
Dodd-Frank, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2015/03/financial-market-utilities-one-more-dangerous-concept-in-doddfrank.
119 Among the designated FMUs are the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. and ICE Clear
Credit LLC, both of which clear swaps. Fin. Stability Oversight Council: Designations, DEP’T
TREASURY (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/
default.aspx#FMU.
120
Dodd-Frank Act § 805(a)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(2) (2012)) (relating to
setting standards); id. § 807 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5466 (2012)) (relating to examination and
enforcement).
121

Id. § 805(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(b) (2012)).

122

Id. § 805(c) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(c) (2012)).

123

Id. § 806(e) (12 U.S.C. § 5465(e) (2012)).
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Dodd-Frank directs the CFTC, SEC, and the Federal Reserve to develop a joint
risk management supervisory framework for CCPs.124 The Federal Reserve’s
supporting role in CCP oversight allows the SEC and CFTC to benefit from the
Federal Reserve’s pre-crisis regulatory CCP expertise. It also allows the Federal
Reserve to have a window into CCPs that might one day avail themselves of Federal
Reserve accounts, services, and discount window advances—privileges Dodd-Frank
authorizes the Federal Reserve to make available to designated CCPs.125
Under Titles VII and VIII, the SEC, CFTC, and the banking regulators have
engaged in extensive rulemaking, much of it related to CCPs.126 U.S. CCP regulation
draws heavily from international standards. Dodd-Frank directs the SEC and CFTC
to “prescribe risk management standards [for systemically designated CCPs], taking
into consideration relevant international standards and existing prudential
requirements.”127 International standards governing FMUs predate the financial
crisis,128 but—as Dodd-Frank notes—have been “evolving” since the crisis.129
Most significant among the post-crisis efforts are the Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems (“CPSS”) (subsequently renamed the Committee on Payments
and Market Infrastructures (“CPMI”)) and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”). These organizations issued a revised set of
standards for financial market infrastructures, including CCPs, in 2012.130 As
124 Id. § 813 (12 U.S.C. § 5472 (2012)); see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYS., SEC & CFTC, RISK MANAGEMENT SUPERVISION OF DESIGNATED CLEARING ENTITIES
(2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/813study.pdf (joint report required by section
813).
125
Dodd-Frank Act § 806 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465); see also Financial Market
Utilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 76973 (Dec. 20, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 217 & 225)
(setting out standards under which FMUs can obtain privileges authorized by section 806).
126 See, e.g., Derivatives Clearing Organizations General Provisions and Core Principles,
76 Fed. Reg. 69334 (Nov. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39 & 140);
Customer Clearing Documentation, Timing of Acceptance for Clearing, and Clearing Member
Risk Management, 77 Fed. Reg. 21278 (Apr. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 23,
37, 38 & 39); Clearing Agency Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 66220 (Nov. 2, 2012) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies; 79 Fed. Reg. 29507
(proposed May 27, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Derivatives Clearing
Organizations and International Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 72476 (Dec. 2, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 140 & 190); Enhanced Risk Management Standards for Systemically
Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 49663 (Aug. 15, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39); Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74284 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39 & 50).
127

Dodd-Frank Act § 805(a)(2)(A) (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(2)(A) (2012)).

128

See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERBANK
NETTING SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES (1990),
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d04.pdf; COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECH.
COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL
COUNTERPARTIES (2004), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d64.htm.
129 See 15 U.S.C. §78q-1(i) (2012) (suggesting that the SEC “conform [security-based
swap clearing agency] standards or oversight to reflect evolving United States and
international standards”) (emphasis added).
130

CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77.
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required by Dodd-Frank and encouraged by Basel capital regulations, this lengthy
list of principles informs United States regulation of CCPs.131
Drawing the appropriate balance between safety and access is a key theme of the
CPSS/IOSCO standards. Included in the standards are twenty-four principles for
establishing and running financial market infrastructures.132 Covered matters include
governance, credit and liquidity risk management, access, transparency, and default
management. Table 2 sets forth the relevant principles133 and some key applications
to CCPs.
Table 2: CPSS/IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures134

1

#

Principle
Legal Basis

2

Governance

3

Risk
management
framework

4

Credit risk
management

Key applications to CCPs
A CCP should have a clear legal basis (in all relevant jurisdictions)
for CCP actions, such as novation and netting, which provides
essential certainty to market participants.
An effective governance arrangement, which balances the interests of
a CCP’s owners, board of directors, managers, clearing members,
regulators, and “other stakeholders,”135 allows a CCP to set
appropriate goals, assess its performance, and manage risk.
Boards bear responsibility for model validation and should include a
risk committee, “composed mainly of, and, if possible, led by nonexecutive or independent directors.”136
A CCP should establish and test a risk management framework.
A CCP should incentivize sound risk management by clearing
members.
A CCP should review its credit, liquidity, and operational risks and
risks it poses to others.
A CCP should assess the scenarios that will prevent it from operating
normally and develop recovery or wind-down plans.
A CCP should constantly assess and manage (using margin,
prefunded guaranty fund contributions, and perhaps credit exposure
limits) its current and future credit exposures to members.
A CCP should have the ability to make intraday margin calls.
A systemically important CCP should “maintain additional financial
resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios
that should include . . . the default of the two participants and their

131

Dodd-Frank Act § 805(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(1) (2012)); see also
Enhanced Risk Management Standards for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing
Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 49663 (Aug. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39) (noting
pressure to adopt international standards to enable CCP users to obtain favorable treatment
under the Basel capital rules).
132

CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 14, Table 1.

133

Principles 11 and 24, which are not applicable to CCPs, are omitted

134

Author’s summary of CPSS-IOSCO Principles as they apply to CCPs.

135

Id. at 26.

136

Id. at 28 n.33.
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Principle

5

Collateral
management

6

Margin

137

Id. at 36.

138

Id. at 51.

139

Id. at 50.
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Key applications to CCPs
affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit
exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.”137
(So-called “Cover 2”).
A CCP should conduct daily multi-scenario stress tests, monthly
assessments of the robustness of its stress tests, annual validations of
its risk management models, and reverse stress tests to identify
implausibly extreme market conditions.
A CCP should develop rules for allocating losses and disclose its
default waterfall.
A CCP should collect highly liquid collateral with low credit and
market risks.
A CCP should have an effective system for managing margin calls,
disputes, reporting, deposits, withdrawals, substitutions, and
liquidations.
A CCP should think about what will happen to collateral if the
member posting it defaults and during periods of market stress.
A CCP should apply conservative, stable haircuts and be mindful of
the potential for pro-cyclical haircuts to aggravate systemic risk.
A CCP should consider the unique risks associated with cross-border
collateral.
A CCP should impose collateral concentration limits.
A CCP should establish, routinely assess, and backtest a margin
system to protect itself from counterparty credit risks.
A CCP’s margin should reflect the risks of the relevant products and
markets.
“OTC derivatives require more-conservative margin models because
of their complexity and the greater uncertainty of the reliability of
price quotes.”138
A CCP should use reliable pricing data and appropriate historical
sample periods.
A CCP should collect initial margin that “meet[s] an established
single-tailed confidence level of at least 99 percent of the estimated
distribution of future exposure.”139
A CCP should collect variation margin at least daily, be equipped to
collect intraday, and enforce timely payment.
In setting margin, a CCP should consider close-out/hedging liquidity,
cross-product correlations, jump-to-default risk, and tendency for
margin to be procyclical.
When netting across products, a CCP should assess correlations
among the products and the stability of those correlations during
times of market stress.
A CCP that cross-margins with other CCPs should coordinate closely
and continuously monitor the arrangements.
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7

Principle
Liquidity risk

8

Settlement

9

Money
settlements

10

Physical
deliveries

12

Exchange-ofvalue
settlement
systems
Participant
default rules
and
procedures

13

140

617

Key applications to CCPs
“A [systemically important] CCP should maintain sufficient liquid
resources in all relevant currencies to settle securities-related
payments, make required variation margin payments, and meet other
payment obligations on time with a high degree of confidence under
a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not
be limited to, the default of . . . the two participants and their
affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment
obligation to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.”140
In assessing the sufficiency of its resources, a CCP should count
“cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial
banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps .
. . and repos, . . . , highly marketable collateral held in custody and
investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with
prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in
extreme but plausible market conditions,” and routinely available
central bank lending if the CCP has the necessary collateral.
A CCP should have clear procedures for tapping its liquidity in
ordinary circumstances and emergencies, replenishing depleted
liquidity, and allocating liquidity shortfalls among its members.
A CCP should assess its liquidity needs daily, and rigorously stress
test its ability to meet liquidity demands, reverse stress test for
extreme but implausible scenarios, and assess the reliability of its
liquidity providers.
A CCP should settle transactions at or before the end of the value
date.
A CCP’s rules should provide clear rules about when a settlement is
final.
A CCP should settle in central bank money, when possible, and
otherwise in assets with low credit and liquidity risk and should
monitor its settlement banks.
A CCP should (if possible) use multiple commercial settlement
banks.
A CCP should have clear rules with respect to physical deliveries and
should identify, monitor, and manage the risks of physical
instruments or commodities.
A CCP should ensure that, with respect to linked settlements, it
conditions settlement of each linked obligation on the settlement of
the other.
A CCP should have clear rules and procedures and appropriate tools
for identifying, managing, and containing the consequences of
member defaults.
These procedures should cover prompt close-out of the defaulter’s
positions, hedging, auctions, and seconding of member personnel to
help manage defaults.
Key aspects of the default rules should be public.

Id. at 57.
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#

Principle

14

Segregation
and portability

15

General
business risk

16

Custody and
investment
risks

17

Operational
risk

18

Access and
participation
requirements

141

Id. at 101.

142

Id.
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Key applications to CCPs
A CCP, working with its members, should test default procedures at
least annually.
A CCP should consider requiring members to participate in auctions
and, if necessary, take a share of the defaulter’s portfolio.
A CCP should clearly set forth the order in which resources will be
used to absorb default losses and the obligations of non-defaulting
members.
A CCP should be able to identify, protect, and (in the event of
default) move the positions and collateral of its members’ customers.
A CCP should segregate customer collateral from member collateral
and may segregate customer collateral from other customer collateral.
A CCP should strive for certainty under applicable legal frameworks.
A CCP should disclose its segregation and portability arrangements,
including whether customer accounts are protected on an individual
or omnibus basis.
A CCP should identify, monitor, and manage its general business
risks.
A CCP should have sufficient, high quality, equity-funded liquid
assets to cover at least 6 months of operations and a board-approved
plan for replenishing equity.
When contemplating expansion, a CCP should carefully assess the
risks.
A CCP should hold its and its members’ assets at sound, wellregulated, well-vetted custodians that have proper legal protections in
place and should consider using different custodians to hold margin
and guaranty fund assets.
A CCP should employ a conservative investment strategy.
A CCP should identify, assess, and manage its operational risks
(external events, information technology issues, etc.) and should
ensure its operational capacity can accommodate increased volumes
during a period of stress.
A CCP should have a business continuity plan, including a back-up
site, so it can resume halted operations within 2 hours of a disruption
and settle by day’s end.
A CCP should employ the necessary personnel, set operational
reliability objectives, and test its risk management framework.
A CCP should assess its vulnerability to problems at members,
service providers, and other market infrastructures and perhaps
require them to meet minimum operational standards and should
closely oversee critical service providers.
A CCP’ should permit “fair and open access” pursuant to reasonable,
objective, published, risk-based criteria.141
A CCP should strive for “the least restrictive impact on access”
possible.142
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#

Principle

19

Tiered
participation
arrangements

20

Financial
Market
Infrastructure
Links

21

Efficiency and
effectiveness

22

Communication
Disclosure of
rules, key
procedures &
market data

23

619

Key applications to CCPs
A CCP may impose operational, risk management, financial, and
legal requirements on members, but should avoid sized-based
requirements.
A CCP can tailor participation limits to a member’s risk.
A CCP should monitor its members.
A CCP should consider unique risks arising from market participants
clearing through a clearing member, should require members to
provide information about and manage risks of indirect participants,
and should pay particular attention to high-volume indirect
participants and interdependencies between members and indirect
participants.
A CCP may want to urge a high-volume indirect participant to
become a member.
A CCP should understand how its members handle indirect
participant defaults.
A CCP should identify, monitor, and manage the credit, liquidity,
legal, operational, and financial risks of linking with other financial
market infrastructures.
Risk management for CCP-to-CCP links should be tailored
depending on whether it is a peer-to-peer or participant link, should
consider “potential spill-over effects from the default of the linked
CCP,”143 should include daily should mark-to-market, should
consider risks associated with end-of-the-waterfall loss allocations,
and should consider risks associated with providing margin to or
participating in the default fund of the other CCP.
A CCP should set objectives for meeting members’ needs efficiently
and effectively, should test whether it is meeting those objectives,
and should consider direct and indirect costs (including the
opportunity cost of member assets).
A CCP should communicate with its members using “internationally
accepted communication procedures and standards.”144
A CCP should clearly and publicly disclose changes in rules and
procedures and relevant information, such as its system design,
operations, risk management framework, financial condition,
procedures, rules, membership risks, fees and other participation
costs, and transaction data.

This list provides useful insight into the complexity of CCP management and the
tensions between open access and risk management. Proper CCP management
requires careful consideration and balancing of an array of risk management
questions and important operational and legal issues. These standards reflect the
reality that “[a financial market infrastructure] and its participants may generate
significant negative externalities for the entire financial system and real economy if

143

Id. at 109.

144

Id. at 119.
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they do not adequately manage their risks.”145 The CPSS/IOSCO report notes that
with respect to CCPs, clearing mandates have underscored the importance of both
access to CCPs146 and “the objectives of safety and efficiency are even more
pertinent because national authorities have required or proposed the mandatory use
of centralised clearing” in markets, including the OTC derivatives markets.147
Ironically, while the current regulatory framework is nominally incorporating these
risk management principles, it also undermines CCPs’ ability to adhere to them.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The central clearing mandate and the regulatory infrastructure that has risen up
around it, although well-intentioned, threaten financial stability. Academic
observers, especially including Professor Craig Pirrong, have raised concerns about
CCPs’ potential deleterious effects on financial stability.148 While citing the riskreducing aspects of CCPs, recent annual reports of the Office of Financial Research
and Financial Stability Oversight Council also identified CCPs as a potential source
of systemic risk.149
Carefully designed and operated central clearinghouses can facilitate risk
management by firms and contribute to broader financial stability. Design, however,
matters greatly.150 Regulatory micro-interference in clearing, which can upset careful
designs, is harmful to individual firm risk management and to financial stability.
Together, the clearing mandate, the regulatory influences on the design and
operation of CCPs, and the implicit government backstop threaten to destabilize
CCPs, individual firms’ risk management, and the broader financial system.

145

Id. 11.

146

Id. 15.

147

Id. at 11.

148

See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, A Bill of Goods: Central Counterparties and Systemic Risk, 2
J. FIN. MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES 55 (2014) [hereinafter Pirrong, Bill of Goods]; Craig Pirrong,
The Clearinghouse Cure, REG., Winter 2008-2009, at 44; see also Levitin, supra note 64, at
453; Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641 (2013); Serge
Wibaut & D. Sykes Wilford, Markets for CCPs and Regulation: Considering Unintended
Consequences, 34 INST. J. FIN. TRANSACTIONS 105 (2012).
149

FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 111 (2015), https://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/2015%20FSOC%20Annual%20Report.pdf
(identifying CCPs as a “potential emerging threat and vulnerability”); OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH,
2014 ANNUAL REPORT 66 (2015), https://financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/office-offinancial-research-annual-report-2014.pdf (noting that “[b]anks could face significant losses if a
CCP experienced losses and transmitted them to clearing members” and highlighting potential
liquidity effects of margin requirements).
150 See, e.g., Hamed Amini et al., Systemic Risk and Central Counterparty Clearing 31
(Swiss Fin. Inst. Research, Working Paper No. 13-34, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2275376 (finding that “a CCP does not always reduce systemic risk,”
but that they can reduce systemic risk if their fee and guaranty fund policies are properly
designed).
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A. Potential for Expanded CCPs to Destabilize the Financial System
By nature, CCPs are deeply interconnected with large financial companies and
potentially with other CCPs. CCPs have direct relationships with clearing members
and settlement banks, which tend to be large firms, and indirect relationships with
clearing members’ customers, which may also be large firms. The intricacy of these
relationships makes it difficult for market participants and regulators to get a good
understanding of the risks associated with CCPs.151 Pirrong has warned that “clearing
has turned out to be the Mother of All Interconnections, because every big financial
institution is connected to all big CCPs, and because pretty much everyone has to
funnel the bulk of their derivatives trades through clearinghouses.”152 Because CCPs
are so large, interconnected, and integral to the operation of the financial markets,
many market observers have identified them as Dodd-Frank’s addition to the toobig-to-fail ranks.153 Taking it a step further, one expert noted that they ought to be
categorized as “V-SIFIs”—very important systemically important financial
institutions154—to distinguish them from their too-big-to-fail brethren—the
systemically important financial institutions that are designated for special Federal
Reserve oversight in Title I of Dodd-Frank.
151

See, e.g., Steigerwald, supra note 60, at 23 (“CCPs provide enhanced transparency for
cleared financial contracts. Such transparency is beneficial, but it comes packaged in an
institutional form that also contains undeniable, and perhaps, irreducible opacity.”).
152 See
Craig Pirrong, The Fifth Year of the Frankendodd Life Sentence,
STREETWISEPROFESSOR.COM (July 21, 2015), http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=9472; see also
Colleen M. Baker, The Federal Reserve’s Supporting Role Behind Dodd-Frank’s
Clearinghouse Reforms, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 177, 186 (2013) (“[W]ell-intentioned
reforms of OTC derivatives markets could ultimately create an impossibly interconnected,
concentrated, international web of clearinghouses, central banks, and swap lines resulting in a
solution potentially worse than the original problem.”).
153

See, e.g., Julia Lees Allen, Note, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A
Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1100 (2012) (“[T]he
mandatory clearing provisions . . . in reality force the creation of a new wave of too-big-to-fail
financial institutions: derivatives clearinghouses.”); Frances Coppola, It’s Not Just Banks That
Are Too Big to Fail, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/
2014/04/30/its-not-just-banks-that-are-too-big-to-fail/ (“CCPs are unquestionably too big to
fail. In seeking to end “too big to fail” in OTC derivatives trading, we may actually have made
the problem worse.”); McPartland, supra note 67, at 3 (“Bringing even more derivatives
instruments into clearing and settlement systems will concentrate market and operational risk
even more than today, making it all the more important that CCPs function flawlessly.”);
Hester Plumridge, What If a Clearing House Failed?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204397704577074023939710652 (“Clearing
houses may be the next too-big-to-fail institutions . . . . [T]hey are about to take on a lot more
risk, and there is no plan in place to deal with a big player failing. That should set alarm bells
ringing.”); James Rundle, Helping Clearing Houses Avoid a Crash, FIN. NEWS (May 20,
2015), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2015-05-20/helping-rescuers-avoid-turbulenceclearing-houses (“Having been given such a level of systemic importance by world leaders,
the scenario that some clearers may, in fact, become too big to fail, ironically a state of play
that the regulators have been trying to stamp out among clearing members, is very real.”).
154
Manmohan Singh, Making OTC Derivatives Safe—A Fresh Look 18 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 11/66, 2011), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
2011/wp1166.pdf.
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To attract users, CCPs have an incentive to be large and to clear multiple product
types. Seeking to maximize their ability to net positions and economize on initial
margin and guaranty fund contributions, users favor a CCP that enables them to net
across many counterparties and multiple products. CCPs face strong pressure to clear
multiple products or link with other CCPs because the alternative to central
clearing—bilateral netting—occurs across asset classes. Professors Darrell Duffie
and Haoxiang Zhu show that”[r]elative to the case of fully bilateral netting (no
clearing), substantial [counterparty risk reduction] benefits can be obtained by the
joint clearing of the four major classes of derivatives” and call for “the joint clearing
of standard interest-rate swaps and credit default swaps in the same
clearinghouse.”155 Risk management, already complex for CCPs clearing OTC
derivatives, is even more difficult in large, multi-product CCPs.
An alternative to clearing products in the same CCP is linking CCPs.
International Monetary Fund economist Manmohan Singh explains that the “ideal
‘first-best’ solution” would be a “single CCP with an adequate multicurrency central
bank liquidity backstop that is regulated and supervised and spans the broadest range
of derivatives.”156 He explains that interoperability—a process by which CCPs link
together for the convenience of their clearing members—is “a proxy for [this] ‘firstbest’ solution.”157 Regulators, recognizing these netting efficiencies and drawn to the
ease of overseeing a few large CCPs rather than many smaller ones, may also favor
large, interlinked CCPs.158 To date, however, calls for interoperability of derivatives
CCPs have mostly not materialized, in part because of the thorny risk management
issues such linkages produce.159
CCPs function by making and receiving payments according to a strict timeline.
For example, after marking positions to market, the CCP collects variation margin
from the accounts of losing parties and credits it to the accounts of winning parties.
Adherence to a strict timeline of payments is important to keep the system working.
During a crisis, CCPs likely would face significant liquidity strains.160 Professor
155 Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce
Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74, 76, 83 (2011).
156 Singh, supra note 154, at 5; see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL
STABILITY, supra note 70, at 93 (“A single global CCP for OTC derivatives would provide
maximum economies of scale and systemic counterparty risk reduction, but similar
efficiencies can be achieved by linking multiple CCPs . . . .”).
157

Singh, supra note 154, at 7.

158 Regulatory territorialism may act as a brake on CCP size and interoperability. The
CFTC and its European counterparts, for example, have been struggling over whether U.S.
CCPs will be recognized in Europe. See, e.g., Joint Statement of CFTC Chairman Timothy
Massad and European Commissioner Jonathan Hill (May 7, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/massadstatement050715 (providing progress update on
“discussions on a possible equivalence decision by the European Commission for central
counter parties (CCPs) that are regulated and supervised by the CFTC”).
159

For a concise discussion of the costs and benefits of interoperability, see GREGORY,
supra note 59, at § 8.5.1.
160
See, e.g., Paul Tucker, Central Counterparties in Evolving Capital Markets: Safety,
Recovery and Resolution, 17 BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN. STABILITY REV. 179, 183 (2013)
(highlighting likely liquidity needs of a CCP managing a default); Transcript of CFTC Market
Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 89, at 83 (statement of Susan McLaughlin,
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Mark Roe points out “the collateral available to one creditor, namely the
clearinghouse, is value denied to other creditors.”161 If those other creditors are also
systemic, the CCP may not serve to reduce systemic risk.162 Knott and Mills note that
a CCP could destabilize the financial system by making protective margin calls that
cause members “to sell assets in a second market, driving down prices there.”163
They further explain that if margin payments are delayed, “the CCP may redistribute
part of its risk to liquidity providers such as banks.”164 A CCP without adequate
liquidity to pay its counterparties would cause those counterparties in turn to miss
payments.165 Pirrong explains numerous ways in which the clearing mandate
contributes to systemic risk, including (as Roe also argues) by shifting risk from
derivatives counterparties to other creditors of failed firms, increasing borrowing to
meet margin requirements, creating large demands for liquid assets during times of
great stress, and imposing losses on firms through the default fund at times when
those firms can least bear them.166
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.) (“[I]f a CCP were for some reason unable to perform on the
defaulting member's payment obligations in a timely manner and in the expected currency, its
surviving members would face liquidity shortfalls that would quickly trigger a cascade of
failures on their obligations to their counterparties beyond the CCP, transmitting liquidity risk
more broadly to a wider set of market participants.”).
161

Roe, supra note 148, at 1664.

162

Id. at 1671-72. But see Squire, supra note 54, at 891 (arguing that CCPs are stability
enhancing because they ensure that some creditors get paid quickly without slowing down
payments to other creditors).
163
Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 164; see also Dietrich Domanski et al., Central
Clearing; Trends and Current Issues, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2015, at 72,
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1512g.pdf (“[E]xtreme price movements in cleared
financial instruments could result in large variations in the exposure of clearing members to
the CCPs and therefore in the need for some of them to make correspondingly large variation
margin payments. Such payments can be large, even if margin requirements remain
unchanged. But they may be exacerbated if the CCP increases initial margins and/or tightens
collateral standards in the face of unusually large price movements. The interaction of such
sudden and large shifts in collateral flows with the wider financial system is untested . . . . The
demands and dispositions of CCPs could lead to big shifts in collateralised markets, adding to
risk aversion and increasing pressure to reduce leverage in a procyclical manner.”).
164

Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 164.

165
See, e.g., Patrick M. Parkinson, Speech to Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual
Over the Counter Derivatives Symposium: CCP Liquidity Risk Management and Related
Failure Management Issues (Apr. 11, 2014) (noting that “central concern with respect to CCP
liquidity risk is that a failure of one or more clearing members to meet variation margin calls
on time could cause the CCP itself to be unable to meet its own payment obligations as and
when expected” and that “[s]uch a failure could jeopardize the ability of its nondefaulting
clearing members to meet their payment obligations when expected and thus is a potential
vector for financial contagion”).
166 Pirrong, Bill of Goods, supra note 148, at 62-74; see also Daniel K. Tarullo, Speech at
the Office of Financial Research and Financial Stability Oversight Council's 4th Annual
Conference on Evaluating Macroprudential Tools: Complementarities and Conflicts:
Advancing Macroprudential Policy Objectives (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/tarullo20150130a.htm (raising concerns about, among other things, CCPs
imposing losses on large firms during times of crises).
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Further complicating matters, clearing members are likely to be large financial
institutions that play multiple roles and have multiple relationships with each CCP.
Clearing members may themselves be or may be affiliated with settlement banks or
the providers of lines of credit on which CCPs rely.167 Prearranged lines of credit
might not materialize during a crisis, particularly if the lending bank is a clearing
member.168 Federal Reserve Governor Powell points out that “[t]he failure of a large
clearing member that is also a key service provider could disrupt the smooth and
efficient operation of one or multiple CCPs, and vice versa.”169 The CCP has to
consider the full scope of its relationship with clearing members when, for example,
it considers the effects of a member default or a margin call or assessment on
surviving members.170
The 1987 stock market crash illustrated how closely CCPs are tied to the banking
system, how important payment timing is, and how CCPs can adversely affect the
financial system during a crisis.171 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke,
who studied the issue, concluded that the “the system taken as a whole (i.e.,
including the Fed) performed acceptably during the crash.”172 However, the clearing
167 Froukelien Wendt, Central Counterparties: Addressing Their Too Important to Fail
Nature 9 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/21, 2015), https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1521.pdf (“Global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and
other commercial banks may fulfill roles of general clearing member (clearing for clients),
liquidity provider, depository bank, custodian and settlement bank.”).
168

See, e.g., Parkinson, supra note 165; Steigerwald, supra note 60, at 21-22.

169

Jerome H. Powell, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Speech at the 17th
International Banking Conference: A Financial System Perspective on Central Clearing of
Derivatives 4 (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
powell20141106a.htm (“To carry out their critical functions, CCPs rely on a wide variety of
financial services from other financial firms, such as custody, clearing, and settlement. Many
of these services are provided by the same global financial institutions that are also the largest
clearing members of the CCPs.”); see also Domanski et al., supra note 163, at 59, 68 (“The
CCP’s own liquid assets and backup liquidity lines made available by banks may provide
effective insurance against liquidity shocks resulting from the difficulties of one or a few
clearing members. But they can hardly provide protection in the event of a systemic shock,
when a large number of clearing participants – potentially including the providers of liquidity
lines – become liquidity-constrained, thereby triggering domino effects.”).
170
See, e.g., Wendt, supra note 167, at 9 (“[A CCP is a] particularly vulnerable to the
default of a service-providing clearing member . . . not only because it has to cover the default
of the clearing member, but because it may also lose access to the collateral kept by that
clearing member in its role as custodian[,] . . . may lose access to the credit lines that were
provided by the defaulting clearing member and it may face operational problems due to the
loss of one of its settlement banks.”).
171
See generally DEP’T TREASURY, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET
MECHANISM (1988), https://archive.org/details/reportofpresiden01unit (known as the Brady
Commission Report, describing the events of the 1987 crash); see also McPartland, supra note
67, at 3 (“[A] CCP can only remove market risk from its clearing system when the national
banking system is open.”). McPartland goes on to explain that “late settlement payments
associated with derivatives markets were one of the root causes of near payments gridlock
during the 1987 market crash.” Id. at 3.
172
Ben S. Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 133,
134 (1990).
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and settlement system suffered from “malfunctions of communications and
information processing systems” and “financial gridlock as banks and other creditors
became cautious about transferring funds to individuals or institutions whose
solvency might be in doubt.”173 These fears seemed to have helped to drive prices
down.174 Bernanke further notes that clearinghouses’ sensible margin calls “were
widely criticized in postmortems for ‘draining liquidity from the system.’”175 Federal
Reserve intervention kept the system functioning through the 1987 crisis.176
Since 1987, systems have improved, but real concerns remain about how well a
CCP could continue to function in the face of even one member default, if the
financial system were also facing other stresses. Would “sensible margin calls” once
again threaten the financial system? Because of new post-crisis rules, liquid assets
will be at even more of a premium than they were during the last crisis.177
Default management might also be difficult in the Dodd-Frank world of stricter
capital standards and mandatory clearing. Strict capital requirements may prevent
non-defaulting clearing members from taking on the defaulter’s client’s portfolios.178
Particularly if the defaulter’s portfolio contains unusual products, the CCP may not
be able to borrow the needed trading personnel from non-defaulting members, who
may not be able to part with their expertise during a crisis.179 Multiple CCPs may be
competing for the same liquid assets, personnel, capacity of clearing members to
take on additional positions from defaulters’ portfolios, and perhaps even capacity of
clearing members to replenish guaranty funds or meet unfunded assessments.
Professor Mark Roe notes that CCPs are not well-suited to handle crises like the
last one in which multiple firms ran into trouble simultaneously. Not only would
CCPs potentially be vulnerable,180 but they could make matters worse by
transmitting problems to a broader set of firms.181 If one CCP were affected, others
would likely also be affected.182 As the following table illustrates, CCPs share many
members, which eases risk transmission from one CCP to another.
173

Id. at 146-47. The IMF points to the role that operational weaknesses played during the
1987 crash in the near failures of the CME and the OCC. IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY
REPORT, supra note 30, at 108-109.
174

Bernanke, supra note 172, at 148.

175

Id. at 147.

176 Id. at 149 (“[T]he Federal Reserve, in its lender-of-last-resort capacity . . . induce[d] the
banks (by suasion and by the supply of liquidity) to make loans on customary terms, despite
chaotic conditions and the possibility of severe adverse selection of borrowers.”).
177 See, e.g., Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed.
Reg. 61440 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329).
178
Transcript of CFTC Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 89, at 95
(statement of Emily Portney, JPMorgan).
179

See, e.g., id. at 89 (statement of Scott Flood, Citi’s Inst. Client Grp.)

180

Roe, supra note 148, at 1675. For a helpful illustration of how problems at a CCP could
spread, see Wendt, supra note 167.
181

Roe, supra note 148, at 1675.

182

See Domanski et al., supra note 163, at 68-69 (“In the extreme case, the default of
common clearing members could threaten the resilience of several CCPs at the same time
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Table 3: Overlapping CCP Members183
Members

CME
IRS

CME
CDS

Bank of America, N.A.

ICE Clear
Credit

LCH Clearnet
LLC OTC CDS

●

Bank of Montreal

●

Barclays Bank PLC

●

Barclays Capital Inc.

●

●

●

●

BNP Paribas Securities Corp.

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Citibank N.A.
Citigroup Global Markets Inc.

●

Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank

●
●

Credit Suisse International

●

●

●

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC

●

●

●

Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.

●
●

●

●

Goldman Sachs Bank USA

●
●

Goldman Sachs International
Goldman, Sachs & Co.

●

●
●

●

●

HSBC Bank plc

●

HSBC Bank USA, N.A.

●

●

HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.

●

●

●

J.P. Morgan Securities LLC

●

●

●

●

●

●

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated

●

●

Merrill Lynch International
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC

●
●

●

●

●

Morgan Stanley Capital Services LLC

●

Nomura International PLC

●

Nomura Securities International, Inc.

●

Rabo Securities USA Inc.

●

RBC Capital Markets LLC

●

●

●

●

[which], in turn, would impose strains on the surviving clearing members, propagating
systemic risk.”)
183 Clearing Firms, CME GRP., www.cmegroup.com/tools-information/clearing-firms.html
(last visited Apr. 23, 2016); Ice Clear Credit: Participants, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH.,
http://www.theice.com/clear-credit/participants (last visited Apr. 23, 2016); Current
Membership, LCH.CLEARNET, www.lchclearnet.com/members-clients/members/currentmembership (last visited Apr. 23, 2016).
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Members

CME
IRS

Royal Bank of Canada
SG Americas Securities, LLC
Société Générale

CME
CDS
●

ICE Clear
Credit

●

●

●
●

The Royal Bank of Scotland plc

●

The Toronto-Dominion Bank

●

UBS AG, London Branch

Wells Fargo Securities, LLC

●

LCH Clearnet
LLC OTC CDS

●

The Bank of Nova Scotia

UBS Securities LLC

627

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

If a CCP stopped meeting its obligations altogether, it could greatly impede
markets. A CCP that cannot meet its payment obligations could stop the markets for
which it clears from functioning.184 Because CCPs tend to dominate particular
markets, there might not be a substitute CCP, so the market for any OTC derivatives
cleared at the failing CCP and subject to the clearing mandate would lock up. The
statutory framework does not explicitly allow for emergency termination or
suspension of the clearing mandate,185 which could help to alleviate the problem. The
status of contracts at a failing CCP would also be uncertain and perhaps that status
would not be resolved for a long time.186
B. Potential for Clearing Mandate to Undermine Risk Management Outside the CCP
Although characterized as a risk management measure, the clearing mandate may
impede market participants’ ability to measure and manage their risks. The clearing
mandate affects how firms manage their business risks and exposures to CCPs and
other firms.

184

See, e.g., Parkinson, supra note 165 (“If confidence in a CCP is shattered and, as is
often the case, no other CCP serves the market, the market would cease functioning.”).
185 FIA Europe raised a different permutation of this issue—a CCP would have to continue
clearing a product subject to a clearing mandate and taking on the associated risk during a
crisis. FIA EUR., A REVIEW OF THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN DERIVATIVES LAW
REFORM
12
(2015),
https://europe.fia.org/sites/default/files/content_attachments/
FIA%20Europe_%20A%20review%20of%20the%20cumulative%20effect%20of%20Europea
n%20derivatives%20reform_Position%20Paper.pdf (“[T]he clearing obligation cannot be
terminated or suspended as a matter of urgency in extreme circumstances. This means that
CCPs may find themselves clearing more risk in a contract or product than there would be
market capacity to manage upon a member default. A CCP may therefore have no option but
to encourage participants to reduce these clearing provisions by increasing margin
requirements to levels at which it is uneconomic to hold the positions and thus force the risk to
be closed out.”).
186

See, e.g., David Elliott, Central Counterparty Loss-Allocation Rules 6 (Bank of
England, Fin. Stability, Paper No. 20, 2013), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper20.pdf (discussing how “[t]he failure of a
CCP could be very disruptive”).
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A frequently cited risk management concern relates to the effect that clearing
will have on bilateral netting. Dealers in the OTC markets use netting to manage
their exposures to other counterparties, but mandatory clearing affects their ability to
do this.187 Singh has explained that mandatory clearing can interfere with bilateral
netting as some contracts are moved to CCPs and others remain bilateral contracts.188
Bilateral netting opportunities with a particular counterparty decrease if some of the
transactions with that counterparty are moved to a CCP.
The clearing mandate and associated disincentives on using uncleared swaps—
such as higher margin requirements for uncleared swaps, capital charges, and antievasion provisions—may discourage firms from dealing in and using uncleared
swaps. The emphasis on clearing has overshadowed the value of these bilateral
agreements, which enable companies to manage their risks with a greater precision
than they could with standardized products. Firms may forgo derivatives-based
hedging altogether or may use a less tailored cleared product to hedge their risk.189 If
companies do so, there will be unhedged business risk. Alternatively, Columbia
University scholar Ilya Beylin argues that market participants seeking to avoid the
clearing mandate could resort to more complicated, less transparent, and therefore
more risky transactions.190 Not only do bilateral derivatives offer firms the chance to
manage their risks precisely, but they are also often part of a larger customer
relationship between a company and a dealer bank. That relationship may include
unique collateral arrangements, such as arrangements that allow a firm to post
illiquid assets or not to post collateral below a specified threshold. Forcing
derivatives transactions into CCPs, which cannot replicate these accommodations,
will disrupt these bilateral relationships.
New risk management challenges also arise in connection with the heavier
collateral demands associated with central clearing. Both clearing members and their
customers will have to post collateral in the liquid form demanded by CCPs.191
Customers may enter into new relationships to borrow collateral. As Jon Gregory
points out, CCPs demand variation margin from losing counterparties more
frequently than they post it to gaining counterparties.192 If banks meet the demand by
187
For a discussion of this topic, see Paul M. McBride, The Dodd-Frank Act and OTC
Derivatives: The Impact of Mandatory Central Clearing on the Global OTC Derivatives
Market, 44 INT’L LAW. 1077, 1106-08 (2010).
188
Singh, supra note 154, at 4 (“Offloading only standard contracts will adversely impact
the net exposure on their books as this will ‘unbundle’ netted positions.”).
189
For an excellent discussion of the potential for lost hedging opportunities and increased
costs for swaps end users as a result of the central clearing mandate, see McBride, supra note
187, at 1111-19. Market observers have noted that futures products are emerging to take the
place of certain types of swaps. See, e.g., COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PUBLIC
ROUNDTABLE ON FUTURIZATION OF SWAPS (2013), www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/
documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission13_013113-trans.pdf.
190

Beylin, supra note 5, at 15, 48.

191 For a discussion of the association between central clearing and high collateral
demands, see Singh, supra note 154, at 5.
192

GREGORY, supra note 59, at 151 (“CCPs may make one or more intradaily margin calls
per day and typically only return margin once a day. Such effects would be most pronounced
during volatile markets where large price moves may cause CCPs to ask for very large
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lending liquid assets to their customers to post as collateral, “the tail risk may not
leave their books,” as central clearing proponents hoped it would.193 The magnitude
of that risk may be difficult to estimate. A more technical concern, raised by
Professor Ronald Anderson and Karin Jõeveer, is the likely operational strains on
clearing members of frequent margin calls by CCPs.194
Greater use of CCPs raises new concerns about exposure to clearinghouse risk.
Clearing members and—to a lesser degree—their customers have to estimate and
manage the risks they face because of their interactions with CCPs. As Table 1
shows, CCPs employ a default waterfall that maps out loss allocations in the event of
a member default, but what happens at the end of the waterfall may not be clear.
Also unclear is whether and how any of the losses CCP clearing members bear will
be shared with their customers.195 These uncertainties make modeling CCP risk
difficult. A JPMorgan research paper found that “for realistic assumptions, the
systemic CCP risk a clearing member is exposed to is not negligible” and “is given
by a sum of exposures to each of the clearing members.”196 To enable more precise
modeling of their exposure to CCPs, clearing members are pushing for greater ex
ante clarity about what will happen if a CCP runs into trouble.197 To manage their
risk, members need to understand whether tail losses will be absorbed by CCP
intraday margins from some participants covering their losses, whilst possibly not returning
immediately the equivalent margin against gains of other clearing members.”).
193

Singh, supra note 154, at 9.

194

Ronald W. Anderson & Karin Jõeveer, The Economics of Collateral 35 (Fin. Mkt
Group, Discussion Paper No. 732, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2427231 (“[M]oving toward central clearing with product specialized CCPs can greatly
increase the numbers of margin movements which will place greater demands on a
participant’s operational capacity and liquidity.”).
195

For a discussion of this issue, see Elliot, supra note 186, at 10.

196

Matthias Arnsdorf, Central Counterparty Risk, 5 J. RISK MGMT. FIN. INSTITUTIONS 273,
286 (2012); see also Joe Renison, Risk USA: Few Options to Manage CCP Exposure, Says
RBS Chief Credit Officer, RISK MAG. (Oct. 23, 2013) (reporting that concerns by the Royal
Bank of Scotland’s chief credit officer, Lesley Jones, that managing risks through a CCP,
rather than bilaterally, exposes clearing members to more severe losses); Transcript of CFTC
Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 89, at 72 (statement of Kristen
Walters, BlackRock) (raising questions about “the actual estimate of potential loss to our
clients in the instance of default”).
197
See, e.g., Rundle, supra note 153 (“Not surprisingly, clearing members are wanting
more transparency on how clearing houses will operate in a crisis. Concerns are high that the
stress-testing methodologies they use and the extent to which members might be required to
prop up a clearer are ill-defined, to the point that it may increase risk in stressed markets.”).
CCPs are not particularly sympathetic to this concern. See, e.g., Letter from Terrence A.
Duffy, Executive Chairman & President, CME Group, Robert Druskin, Executive Chairman,
Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., Scott A. Hill, Chief Financial Officer Int’l Exch., Inc., &
Craig S. Donohue, Executive Chairman, Options Clearing Corp. to Jacob L. Lew, Chairman,
Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/
CME_DTCC_ICE_OCC_Letter.pdf (“With full transparency into a CCP’s financial
safeguards and default management practices, clearing members and participants have
sufficient information to evaluate the risk profile of the CCP and manage their own
exposures.”).
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capital, clearing member assessments, variation margin gain haircuts, or some other
method. Also relevant to these risk assessments is how large a slice of default losses
CCPs will bear and at what point in the waterfall.198 As will be discussed in the next
section, however, if clearing members do not bear a sufficient portion of the tail risk,
they will not adequately monitor their counterparties.
C. Mandated Central Clearing Could Impair Counterparty Monitoring
Clearing mandates may force some risks into CCPs that would be better handled
through bilateral transactions. One of the main functions of a CCP is to eliminate the
need for a buyer of a derivatives contract to monitor the seller and vice versa. Buyers
and sellers planning to clear centrally can be indifferent about the identity of their
counterparty.199 Although they will bear some risk to one another through the
guaranty fund and potential for additional assessments or haircuts on non-defaulters,
that exposure is diluted. As a consequence, less inter-dealer monitoring will take
place than it did prior to the clearing mandate.200 Loss is mutualized and risk
management is centralized at the CCP.
CCPs have certain risk management advantages. They can monitor risk in a more
holistic way from their central perch that comes with broad access to information.201
CCPs have more information about a clearing member’s positions than a dealer in a
bilateral market would have about another dealer’s positions. The CCP may also
require clearing members to provide specified information and submit to
monitoring.202 Pirrong has argued, however, that CCPs do not have information of as
high quality as the hedge funds and banks that “specialize precisely in understanding
risks and pricing . . . especially . . . for more complex and novel derivative
instruments.”203 CCPs do not have access to the detailed market-specific knowledge
198
See, e.g., BLACKROCK, CENTRAL CLEARING COUNTERPARTIES AND TOO BIG TO FAIL 3
(2014) (“Having more skin in the game will incentivize the CCPs to at all times have robust
risk management and would align incentives between the CCP, clearing members and market
participants.”). But see Benoît Cœuré, Lecture, Ensuring an Adequate Loss-Absorbing
Capacity of Central Counterparties, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 2015
Symposium on Central Clearing (Apr. 10, 2015) (arguing that the primary responsibility for
loss absorption should remain with clearing members, so they adequately monitor risks);
LCH.CLEARNET, supra note 81, at 27 (“Skin in the game is not designed as a material
component of loss absorption; its purpose is to align incentives of the CCP operator with those
of the clearing members. Any requirement for the CCP operator to contribute significant
additional resources to the default waterfall would fundamentally change the operator’s risk
profile, creating increased risk exposure to member default at the very time that the market
needs the operator to be resilient.”).
199 See, e.g., McPartland, supra note 67, at 2 (“In an electronic trading environment,
clearing provides valuable anonymity; buyer and seller (and buying clearing member and
selling clearing member) rarely know (or need to know) each other’s identity.”).
200

See, e.g., Roe, supra note 148, at 1694-95.

201

See, e.g., Parkinson, supra note 165, at 6 (“[P]erhaps the most important reason a CCP
can reduce risk is that a CCP has a more complete picture of the aggregate risks posed by
participants than do counterparties to uncleared transactions”).
202

See Hills et al., supra note 62, at 128.

203
Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice 14 (ISDA,
Discussion Papers Series No. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Pirrong, Economics of Central Clearing].
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possessed by dealers in the OTC markets. Even if they did, their ability to act on it is
limited. Central clearing generally eliminates the counterparty-specific pricing that is
possible in bilateral transactions.204 Whereas the amount of initial margin in a
bilateral contract would likely depend on the counterparty, in central clearing, initial
margin is typically not dependent on the creditworthiness of the counterparty.205
Market participants might even employ their market-specific knowledge to
strategically take on risks that they know will be offloaded to a CCP. Former British
central banker Paul Tucker makes the point that “firms using a CCP have incentives
to take more counterparty credit risk in their market transactions than otherwise,
discriminating less when choosing with whom to trade because their credit exposure
is not to their market counterparty but rather to the clearing house—unless the tail
risk is credibly mutualized.”206 Efforts to increase the CCP’s “skin-in-the-game” in
the event of a member default could exacerbate the problem of clearing members’
offloading risk—intentionally or carelessly—to CCPs.207
Intra-industry monitoring was likely more intense with the old mutualized, selfregulated model of clearinghouse ownership. Dealers in a particular product became
members of the relevant CCP, managed the CCP, and—if a member ran into
trouble—cooperatively managed the default and shared any losses. Members,
therefore, had a strong interest in ensuring the rigor of the CCP’s membership
criteria, the efficacy of its other risk management mechanisms, and the efficiency of
its default management protocol. The standard current model for swaps CCPs,
however, is a for-profit model in which the clearing members, who are not the sole
owners and regulators, drive CCPs’ risk management decisions.208 CCPs that are not
owned by members, but nevertheless allow members a significant voice in risk
204 See, e.g., PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note 6, at 10; Wibaut & Wilford, supra note
148, at 114 (explaining that CCPs tend to “apply one-size-fits-all margin and trading fee
policies irrespective of the end user’s credit quality”).
205 See, e.g., GREGORY, supra note 59, at 155 (“Initial margin depends primarily on the
market risk of the centrally cleared trades and only a small component, if any, is linked to the
credit quality of the clearing member.”).
206

Paul Tucker, Speech at the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Symposium: Are
Clearinghouses the New Central Banks? (2014); see also Felix B. Chang, The Systemic Risk
Paradox: Banks and Clearinghouses Under Regulation, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 747, 773
(2014) (“Lulled by a false sense of security and goaded by improvements in hedging from
DCOs, players might take on more derivatives at greater notional values. Counterparties might
monitor each other less, trusting that DCOs are doing so—whereas counterparties trading
bilaterally likely understand each other better than a DCO would.”).
207
See, e.g., Cœuré, supra note 198 (“In fact, a substantial increase of ‘skin in the game’
could provide clearing members with a false sense of security, by reducing their potential
contribution to the loss-allocation process. This could lead them to be less vigilant in
monitoring risks, which may have severe consequences for the safety of CCPs . . . . [I]t seems
reasonable that an increase in prefunded resources, should it become necessary, should be
mainly borne by clearing members.”).
208 CME demutualized in 2000 and is a publicly held company that owns CCPs. CME
Group Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 5 (2014), http://investor.cmegroup.com/investorrelations/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1156375-14-12. Intercontinental Exchange, a publicly held
company, owns ICE Clear Credit, which clears CDS. Id. LCH.Clearnet, a public company,
owns CCPs, including LCH.Clearnet LLC, which clears OTC swaps. Id. at 2.
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management, can properly align incentives, but the clearing mandate and related
intense regulatory involvement in shaping risk management standards may make
effective arrangements of this sort more difficult.
For-profit CCPs can compete on the provision of effective and efficient risk
management,209 which protects the clearing members from bearing losses should
another member default, yet does not tie up unduly large amounts of capital. Credit
rating agency Moody’s recently issued a proposed methodology for rating CCPs
along these lines.210 More generally, the CPSS-IOSCO principles are intended to
facilitate cross-CCP comparisons.211 Greater transparency by CCPs helps both direct
and indirect clearing members to assess CCPs.212 The clearing mandate, however,
makes it hard for a large financial firm to eschew doing business with a poorly
managed CCP that clears a product subject to the mandate. In fact, firms may not
invest much to monitor CCPs if they are effectively forced through legal mandates to
deal with all major CCPs. Incentives to monitor CCPs and choose carefully which
ones to use may be further hampered by Dodd-Frank’s practice of assigning the right
to select a CCP to the non-dealer party to a transaction—the party with the least
incentive to monitor the CCP.213 Further, as discussed below, the Dodd-Frank
framework diminishes the role of financial firms in overseeing CCPs in favor of
regulatory and public interest oversight. As a consequence, even if a dealer discovers
a risk management problem at a CCP, it may not be able to get the CCP to address
the problem.
D. Mandated Clearing Could Force Improper Risks into CCPs
Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandate magnifies the complexity of CCPs’ already
difficult task of managing risk. The clearing mandate, when combined with other
regulatory and economic pressures, encourages CCPs to open their doors to products
that are more difficult to clear than the products typically cleared in the past by
CCPs.
Table 2, which details the many issues confronting CCPs, illustrates the array of
areas in which something could go wrong at a CCP—even one that does not clear
OTC derivatives. As the CPSS-IOSCO report explained in modifying its central
209

LCH.Clearnet, for example, highlights its risk management, including in its slogan
“Trusted Risk Management for Cleared Markets.” See LCH.CLEARNET, supra note 81.
210
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, PROPOSED CLEARING HOUSE RATING METHODOLOGY
(2015), https://www.moodys.com/research/Proposed-Clearing-House-Rating-Methodology-PBC_181095. Moody’s proposes to rate clearing houses according to a number of factors,
including the way they plan for default, their competitive environment, the way they manage
liquidity and counterparty risk, and availability of government and affiliate support. Id. at 5.
211

See supra Table 2.

212
See Cœuré, supra note 198 (arguing that greater transparency about CCP risks helps
users of CCPs, especially “indirect members who, unlike direct members, do not play a direct
role in the CCP's risk governance” to assess CCPs).
213 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 23.432 (2016) (requiring swap dealers and major swap
participants to disclose “that the counterparty has the sole right to select the derivatives
clearing organization at which the swap will be cleared”). The non-dealer’s clearing member
presumably will monitor the CCP, but requiring that the non-dealer choose the CCP still
removes the decision from the party with the most direct access to information about the CCP.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss3/8

44

2016]

CLEARING THE WAY FOR FAILURE

633

counterparty recommendations, “because of the complex risk characteristics and
market design of OTC derivatives products, clearing them safely and efficiently
through a CCP presents unique challenges that clearing listed or cash-market
products may not.”214 The clearing mandate places a weighty thumb on the scale in
favor of clearing that may cause regulators to overlook the “unique challenges” of
clearing OTC derivatives.
The clearing mandate, along with preexisting market pressure to clear
standardized swaps, has been successful in increasing the use of CCPs after the
crisis.215 ISDA reported that “[o]n average, more than 70% of interest rate
derivatives and 80% of CDS index daily notional volume was cleared during the
[first quarter of 2015].”216 The following Figure shows the increasing share of
cleared outstanding swaps over the period from 2012 to 2015.
Figure 5: Interest Rate Swaps and Credit Swaps Centrally Cleared 2012-2015217

214
COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC.
COMM’NS, GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 2004 CPSS-IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS TO
OTC DERIVATIVES CCPS
iii
(2010),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD320.pdf [hereinafter CPSS/IOSCO GUIDANCE]. The document provides an
extensive discussion of the unique complexities of an OTC derivative CCP.
215

Beylin has documented another interesting trend, namely that “the extent of swap activity
within the U.S. by swap dealers has declined substantially . . . since the implementation of the
clearing and platform execution mandates.” Beylin, supra note 5, at 17-23.
216

INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N., SWAPSINFO FIRST QUARTER REVIEW 1 (2015).

217 FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, FSOC 2015 ANNUAL REPORT DATA (2015),
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Pages/2015-annual-report.aspx. Note: FSOC
utilizes CFTC data. These are notional values. Data are adjusted for double-counting of
cleared trades to show a single exposure for each trade. Methodology for collecting and
reporting data changed in October 2013.
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Some of these newly cleared swaps—particularly highly standardized interest
rate swaps—are similar to futures and do not raise unique risk management
concerns. Others may not meet the conditions for clearing: Highly standardized and
liquid derivatives for which sufficient, reliable price data are available throughout
the life of the contract. As Manmohan Singh warns, “pushing CCPs to clear riskier
and less-liquid financial instruments, as the regulators are now demanding, may
increase systemic risk and the probability of a bailout.”218 Single-name CDS
contracts, for example, present a jump-to-default risk that makes them more difficult
to properly margin than standard interest rate contracts.219 Some swaps may behave
unremarkably during normal market conditions, but may be prone to unanticipated,
dramatic price moves.220 Liquidity may fluctuate during a swap’s lifetime.221 Interproduct correlations are also not constant over time.222 CCPs’ margin models—
developed for more standardized, highly liquid derivatives—may not properly
accommodate the unique features of these newly cleared products and their
correlations with other cleared products.223
In deciding which products to clear and how to margin them, CCPs must be alert
to other correlations as well. As CPSS-IOSCO highlighted, correlations among
cleared products and clearing members are also important:
[R]isk may be amplified due to a correlation among risk factors. For
example, a CCP clearing CDS could experience a “double default” where
a reference entity defaults and a CCP’s participant defaults
simultaneously because the participant had a large short position (i.e. sold
credit protections) in the reference entity or where the credit risk of a
218 Singh, supra note 154, at 9; see also Gary Cohn, Clearing Houses Reduce Risk, They
Do Not Eliminate It, FIN. TIMES (June 22, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/974c2c4816a5-11e5-b07f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz40fWse8Qi (setting forth argument by Goldman
Sachs CEO and president that non-standardized products in deeply liquid markets can safely
be cleared, but “in other markets, clearing houses can themselves become centres of
concentrated risk and sources of contagion, amplifying systemic problems instead of
alleviating them” and explaining that “[f]orcing central clearing on . . . complex, illiquid
products that are susceptible to sudden and severe price gaps . . . can have serious
repercussions.”). But see Squire, supra note 54, at 919 (arguing that, in order to increase
netting opportunities, regulators should follow “the aphorism ‘in for a dime, in for a dollar’”).
219
CPSS/ IOSCO GUIDANCE, supra note 214, at 13 (“[S]ome products may have nonlinear risk characteristics (e.g. jump-to-default risk in a single-name CDS).”).
220

See, e.g., Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 172 (“[I]t will be important for CCPs to
develop and enhance scenario-based stress-testing procedures which assess the impact of low
probability, but nonetheless plausible events, which may have no precedent in the current
historical record.”).
221 See, e.g., Pirrong, Economics of Central Clearing, supra note 203, at 18 (“[I]n many
OTC products, liquidity tends to decline over time, and these positions are often retained for
extended periods.”).
222

Wibaut & Wilford, supra note 148, at 112 (“[A]re unlikely to hold when it matters
most—a systemic disruption with significant market contagion.”).
223
See, e.g., Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 170 (“As CCPs expand into new markets, . . .
there is a question about how effectively SPAN [a common margin methodology] can be
adapted to deal with the more complex portfolios that result.”).
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reference entity and that of a participant with a large short position are
highly correlated. In another scenario, a defaulting participant with a short
position may turn out to be the reference entity (self-referencing CDS).224
Dodd-Frank acknowledges that the clearing mandate is not appropriate for all
OTC derivatives. The statute directs the regulators, in deciding whether to impose a
clearing mandate on a swap or group of swaps, to consider a number of factors
including “the existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading
liquidity, and adequate pricing data” along with operational and legal frameworks.225
Based on these factors, regulators could choose not to impose a clearing mandate on
particular swap categories. Other statutory factors—systemic risk mitigation and
competitive implications226—however, seem to nudge regulators to opt for a clearing
mandate, even if there are concerns about inadequate liquidity or pricing data. For
example, in one clearing determination, the CFTC’s discussion of the systemic risk
mitigation factor was conclusory—without any product-specific analysis, central
clearing is simply presumed to mitigate systemic risk:
Clearing the CDS indices subject to this determination will reduce
systemic risk in the following ways: mitigating counterparty credit risk
because the DCO would become the buyer to every seller of CDS indices
subject to this determination and vice-versa; providing counterparties with
daily mark-to-market valuations and exchange of variation margin
pursuant to a risk management framework set by the DCO and reviewed
by the Commission’s Division of Clearing and Risk; posting initial
margin with the DCO in order to cover potential future exposures in the
event of a default; achieving multilateral netting, which substantially
reduces the number and notional amount of outstanding bilateral
positions; reducing swap counterparties’ operational burden by
consolidating collateral management and cash flows; and eliminating the
need for novations or tear-ups because clearing members may offset
opposing positions.227
The analysis repeats the standard arguments for clearing without applying them
specifically to the CDS indices allegedly being analyzed. Thus, although CFTC
Chairman Timothy Massad acknowledged the non-universality of the clearing

224

CPSS/ IOSCO GUIDANCE, supra note 214, at 13.

225

Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(2) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) (2012)).

226

Id.

227
Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg.
74283 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39 & 50).
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mandate in a recent speech,228 the regulatory penchant for clearing may color the
exercise of that care.229
Apart from the policymakers’ tendency to favor clearing, there are strong
commercial, financial, and competitive incentives to extend clearing mandates to
additional categories of swaps. These pressures come from CCPs seeking to expand
their businesses230 and from market participants chafing under dealers’ control of the
bilateral markets.231 Mandated central clearing brings with it new profit opportunities
for firms that do not have large bank balance sheets and therefore were not attractive
counterparties in the bilateral context.232 Expansive central clearing mandates also
can appeal to a broader set of market participants attracted to the capital and margin
savings of centrally cleared products. CCPs offer multilateral netting, which can
reduce collateral demands.233

228 Timothy G. Massad, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote
Address Before the District of Columbia Bar (July 23, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-26 (“We do not want to push all transactions into
clearinghouses. There will always be some products that are not suitable for clearing because
of their illiquidity or other risk characteristics. Clearinghouses will be stronger if we exercise
care in what is centrally cleared.”).
229
See, e.g., Anu Munshi, CCPs—Too Big to Fail? The Danger of Concentration Risk,
DERIVSOURCE (Jan. 13, 2012), http://derivsource.com/content/ccps-%E2%80%93-too-bigfail-danger-concentration-risk (“Add to this the immense pressure from regulators and
politicians for more derivatives to be cleared centrally and as soon as possible, when the CCPs
are already working flat out on implementing a completely new way of operating for OTC
derivatives.”).
230
See, e.g., Gillian Carr, CCPs Mull Equity Swaps Clearing Solutions, RISK.NET (Mar.
20, 2015), http://www.risk.net/structured-products/news/2399385/ccps-mull-equity-swapsclearing-solutions (reporting that a number of CCPs are “exploring the possibility of clearing a
broader range of equity swap products,” which could ultimately lead to new clearing
mandates); Domanski et al., supra note 163, at 72 (“Most CCPs are for-profit entities—
typically vertically integrated with other financial market infrastructures, such as exchanges—
that are strongly motivated to generate revenues by expanding their product offering and
capturing market share. However, new products could bring incremental risk, which clearing
members may end up bearing if the CCP does not increase its capital commensurately.”).
231
See, e.g., Letter from Adam C. Cooper, Senior Managing Director and General
Counsel, Citadel LLC, to David A. Stawick, Secretary, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
4 (Sept. 6, 2012) (“The Determination takes the decisive step, which the market has long
anticipated and prepared for, of making mandatory central clearing of the most liquid and
standardized swaps a reality . . . . We are confident that this transition will support and
incentivize the progressive expansion of the cleared product set, since it will be more
economically efficient for market participants to hold as much as possible of their portfolios in
a single margined basket at a clearinghouse.”).
232
See, e.g., Katy Burne, Citadel Makes Inroads into Swaps Arena, WALL ST. J. (June 22,
2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/citadel-makes-inroads-into-swaps-arena-1434997210
(“Citadel Securities’ emergence as a big market maker in interest-rate swaps may draw other
nonbank firms into what is seen as a potentially lucrative but technically challenging business,
traders said.”).
233
As noted earlier, however, there may be an offsetting decrease in benefits from bilateral
netting opportunities.
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Regulatory advantages to clearing bolster the impetus for broad central clearing
mandates. Among these advantages are potential margin savings compared to
uncleared swaps. Dodd-Frank regulators are designing margin requirements on
uncleared swaps to be more stringent than they would be in the cleared context.234
Basel capital rules, which are being phased in, also offer favorable capital treatment
for swaps cleared through a CCP that meets international standards—a qualifying
CCP or “QCCP”.235 Uncleared OTC derivatives also carry a legal risk as DoddFrank requires the SEC and CFTC to take steps to prevent “evasion of the mandatory
clearing requirements.”236 Regulators, inclined to favor clearing, may paint broadly
with the evasion brush. The legal risk of being classified as evasive likely will stifle
bilaterally negotiated derivatives’ ability to play their important roles in facilitating
risk management and fostering innovation.237 If designing a new way to manage a
client’s risk invites regulatory scrutiny, dealers are likely instead to encourage clients
to use homogenous, cleared products. Uncleared swaps already carry a stigma based
on false crisis narratives,238 and the anti-evasion provisions reinforce this prejudice.

234 See, e.g., Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major
Swap Participants, 79 Fed. Reg. 59897 (proposed Oct. 3, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 23 & 240) (“Given the Congressional reference to the ‘greater risk’ of uncleared swaps
and the requirement that margin for such swaps ‘be appropriate for the risk,’ the Commission
believes that establishing margin requirements for uncleared swaps that are at least as
stringent as those for cleared swaps is necessary to fulfill the statutory mandate.”); see also
Yellen, supra note 53, at 19-20 (“[A] more robust and consistent margin regime for noncentrally cleared derivatives will not only reduce systemic risk, but will also diminish the
incentive to tinker with contract language as a way to evade clearing requirements.”).
235
See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
BANK EXPOSURES TO CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES (2014), http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs282.pdf. For a discussion of how capital rules apply to uncleared and cleared transactions,
see, for example, Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III,
Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach
for Risk-weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced
Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62017
(Oct. 11, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 5, 6, 165 & 167).
236
Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §2(h)(4) (2012)) (directing CFTC to
prevent evasion of clearing mandate with respect to swaps); id. § 763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c-3(d) (2012)) (directing SEC to prevent evasion of clearing mandate with respect to
security-based swaps); see also FIN. STABILITY BD., IMPLEMENTING OTC DERIVATIVES
MARKET REFORMS 21 (2010) (warning regulators to be wary of customization as a way to
avoid clearing).
237
For a discussion of the important role that OTC derivatives have played in risk
management and financial innovation, see POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES
MARKET, supra note 76, at 9-10.
238

See, e.g., Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Remarks
Before the Institute of International Bankers Washington Conference: Over-the-Counter
Derivatives Reform (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
opagensler-28 (“If we exempt a large class of transactions from clearing, we will leave
significant risk on the books of derivatives dealers. This is the same risk that reverberated
throughout the economy during the financial crisis.”).
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E. Regulatory Conflicts of Interest Could Impair CCP Risk Management
CCPs, as originally conceived, brought together a group of members, which
voluntarily pooled and cooperatively managed risks. In the new model, voluntary
cooperative efforts are being replaced by regulatory mandates.239 Not only does the
Dodd-Frank regulatory structure force new risks into CCPs, it makes it more
difficult for CCPs to manage those risks. Because of the important place CCPs have
in the government-made OTC market structure and the at least implicit government
backstop, many policymakers and academics call for intense regulation of CCPs.240
As regulators take a greater interest in CCP risk management, their instinctively proclearing mindset could undermine CCP risk management.
As the CPSS-IOSCO standards laid out in Table 2 show, CCPs must make many
operational and risk management determinations including deciding what to clear,
setting membership standards, designing and using proper margin methodologies,
managing operational risk, properly funding the guaranty fund, and carefully
managing defaults. CCPs also have to make wise operational and technical
decisions. The sum of these determinations affects whether a CCP will support or
undermine the stability of the financial system. Many of these decisions require
sophisticated modeling and complicated trade-offs with implications for CCP risk.241
Regulators are typically viewed as having an important role to play in making key

239
As is evident from housing policy, bank capital requirements, credit ratings, and other
areas in which the government has involved itself in assessing and managing risk, regulators’
influence on these decisions can serve to undermine financial stability. See, e.g., ARNOLD
KLING, NOT WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND: A HISTORY OF POLICIES THAT PRODUCED THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 (2009) (demonstrating role “that broad policy areas—including
housing policy, capital regulations for banks, industry structure and competition, autonomous
financial innovation, and monetary policy” played in bringing about the financial crisis);
PETER WALLISON, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE WORLD’S WORST
CRISIS AND WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN (2015) (discussing the role of failed government
housing policy in the crisis).
240
See, e.g., Massad, supra note 228 (underscoring the importance of CCP regulation
“because of the increased importance we have placed on central clearing”); see also Allen,
supra note 153, at 1106 (calling for strict regulation and a pre-funded guaranty fund with a
government backstop); Bernanke, supra note 56 (explaining that a robust prudential
regulatory regime must accompany access to emergency credit facilities); Powell, supra note
169 (explaining that international CCP standards are “essential given that, in the interest of
transparency and improved risk management, policymakers have encouraged the
concentration of activities at these key nodes”); Tucker, supra note 206, at 12 (explaining that
“[l]ike central banks, clearing houses are part of the essential financial plumbing of modern
economies,” former UK central bank official Paul Tucker argues that CCPs should be
macroprudentially “regulated utilities”). But see Levitin, supra note 64, at 462-63 (identifying
a potential role for regulation of CCP rules, but arguing principally for high capital standards
to serve as a “financial sea wall” for CCPs).
241
See, e.g., IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 30, 18 (noting that “a
CCP that relies on a lower margining and a high guarantee fund may contribute to moral
hazard by encouraging some [clearing members] to take higher risks, since their losses are
mutualized among all [clearing members, while on] the other hand, higher margining and a
lower guarantee fund reduces [clearing members’] potential exposures to other [clearing
members] and may dilute their interest in ensuring that the CCP manages its risks robustly.”).
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risk-management decisions,242 but their involvement in these decisions may not
improve CCP safety.243
The combination of complex risk management questions and the important role
that CCPs play in the broader financial system naturally invites close regulatory
scrutiny. The clearing mandate, however, diverts regulators’ focus from risk
management to incentivizing central clearing. Regulators have acknowledged that
tensions exist.244 Giving risk management considerations their proper place will
continue to be difficult for regulators eager to increase central clearing and keen to
mitigate the competitive effects and costs associated with the clearing mandate.
First, regulators may be moved by factors other than risk management in setting
membership rules. A firm that does not qualify or choose to be a CCP member must
clear through a member (or through a member’s client) or forgo trading in swaps
subject to a clearing mandate.245 The SEC and CFTC have established membership
requirements for CCPs, including a $50 million minimum for member capital.246 The
242
See, e.g., Agostino Capponi & W. Allen Cheng, Incentives Behind Clearinghouse
Requirements 3 (2015), (unpublished manuscript) (concluding, in the context of setting
margin, that “[d]epending on the prevailing equilibrium, regulation may be necessary for
protecting the clearinghouse against default losses”).
243
See, e.g., Wibaut & Wilford, supra note 148 (describing the many pitfalls regulators
face in designing or influencing the design of the CCP landscape).
244

See, e.g., Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75
Fed. Reg. 63732 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39 & 40)
[hereinafter CFTC Conflicts Proposal] (“[I]t is important to mitigate potential conflicts of
interest that may prevent clearable swap contracts from becoming subject to mandatory
clearing. At the same time, the Commission recognizes that the safety and soundness of a
DCO should not be compromised. A DCO must not only have the ability to appropriately
manage the risk associated with each and every contract that it guarantees, it must be able to
decline accepting contracts for clearing if they pose unacceptable risks. In addition, DCO
members must have input in setting membership criteria, because they bear the risk of loss in
the event of member default.”).
245

See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 71, at 16-17 (observing that the clearing mandate
could effectively shut certain parties out of OTC markets subject to a mandate if they are
neither eligible to be members nor desirable clients for a member); see also Clearing Agency
Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 66240 (“[T]he success of correspondent clearing arrangements
depends on the willingness of participants to enter such arrangements with non-participant
firms that may act as direct competitors to the participants in the participants’ capacity as
dealers or security-based swap dealers in the market for the relevant securities.”).
246
See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed.
Reg. 69333, 69356 (Nov. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39) (“The Commission does
not believe that the $50 million threshold would lead to a DCO having to admit clearing
members that are unable to participate in the default management process. As discussed
above, the regulation does not preclude highly-capitalized entities (such as swap dealers) from
participating in a DCO as clearing members. Thus, the addition of smaller clearing members
does not eliminate the role that larger clearing members can play in default management—it
merely spreads the risk.”); Clearing Agency Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 66242 (“[W]e believe
that persons that maintain a net capital level of equal to or greater than $50 million, as well as
an appropriate level of financial expertise, should not be denied participation in a CCP based
solely on their net capital levels, provided that such persons are able to comply with other
reasonable membership standards.”).
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CFTC, in its rule governing DCO membership requirements, struggled to navigate
the line between risk-management and open-access. The CFTC claims to entrust
DCOs “with discretion to balance restrictions on participation with legitimate risk
management concerns” because they are “in the best position in the first instance to
determine the optimal balance.”247 Yet it specifically prohibits DCOs from “sett[ing]
a limit on the number of market participants that may become clearing members,”248
setting more than a $50 million minimum capital requirement for membership,249 and
“requir[ing] members to post a minimum amount of liquid margin or default
guarantee contributions, or to participate in a liquidity facility.”250 These decisions
support open CCP access, but may interfere with legitimate CCP risk management.
There are reasons for favoring broad, diverse membership. Clearing proponents
such as Professor Greenberger hope that a broader, more diverse membership will
“foster long-term stability” and pay off in the event of a default “by distributing the
costs of default across a greater number of members.”251 On the other hand,
observers such as Professor Pirrong argue that homogeneous membership generates
more stable CCPs.252 Broadening CCP membership raises concerns, including the
possibility that the new members will not be operationally able to participate in the
wind-down of a defaulting member’s portfolio or financially able to participate in
default management auctions.253
247

Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 69356.
248

Id.

249

Id. at 69355. The CFTC argued that “the addition of smaller clearing members does not
eliminate the role that larger clearing members can play in default management—it merely
spreads the risk” and that “[s]ubject to appropriate safeguards, outsourcing of certain
obligations can be an effective means of harmonizing these goals.” Id. at 69356. Query
whether these outsourcing arrangements would be honored during a crisis when they would
most likely be called upon. The SEC also employs a $50 million net capital membership
threshold, but “recognizes the benefit of maintaining flexibility to allow a CCP to impose
higher net capital requirements in circumstances where that is necessary to mitigate risks that
could not otherwise be effectively managed by other measures.” Clearing Agency Standards,
77 Fed. Reg. at 66243.
250

Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 69357.
251 See Greenberger, supra note 52, at 256-57; see also Ed Nosal, Clearing Over-theCounter Derivatives, 35 ECON. PERSP. 137, 144 (2010) (arguing that broad membership
fosters liquidity and competition, so any firm that “can cover the risk that it brings into the
CCP, by providing appropriate levels of collateral and making contributions to the guarantee
fund” should be allowed membership”).
252

See, e.g., Pirrong, Economics of Central Clearing, supra note 203, at 27 (“CCPs with
more diverse memberships are more prone to conflict, more cumbersome to manage, less
effective at responding to changes in the marketplace, and less effective at responding to
crises that are likely to have disparate impacts on different types of firms” and are more
vulnerable to “moral hazard problems”).
253
See, e.g., Default Management Process, EUREX CLEARING, http://www.eurexclearing.com/
clearing-en/risk-management/default-management-process (last visited Mar. 16, 2016); CHI.
MERCANTILE EXCH., RULEBOOK, supra note 68, at Rule 8F025 (explaining that traders employed by
certain clearing members will be called upon to advise on hedging, liquidating, and transferring a
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Membership quality has traditionally been a key risk management feature of
CCPs. Angela Armakola and Jean-Paul Laurent underscore the important
relationship between CCP resilience in the face of stress scenarios and the strength
of a CCP’s member base.254 They urge regulators to be “cautious about . . . [the]
subsidizing of low quality [clearing members] that might overload a CCP at the
expense of others, thus jeopardizing the efficiency of the new risk-sharing
mechanisms.”255 They suggest that CCPs consider using “default fund add-ons for
members with decreasing credit quality”256—a feature that runs counter to
regulators’ open-access theme. Professor Jo Braithwaite refers to this as “the
membership dilemma” created by “regulators having framed compulsory legislation
around a private sector legal device designed to mutualise losses for selected
participants.”257 As Professor Hal Scott explains, “[a] clearinghouse is just an
association, so it’s only as strong as the member firms. If you were hell-bent on
fairness, and opened this thing to everybody, that would increase the risk to the
clearinghouse.”258 A United Kingdom financial regulator urged the CFTC to be
careful not to err on the side of excessively lax membership requirements:
Participation requirements sometimes need to be tailored to take into
account the types of products being cleared by a CCP. For example the
less liquid derivative markets typically require more complex default
management processes that impose more onerous obligations on the
participants than the exchange traded futures market. The ability of the
surviving clearing members to meet their obligations in relation to default
management is important in mitigating systemic risk in the event of a
clearing member default.259
Second, the mandated use of CCPs has given them a quasi-public character in
regulators’ eyes, which complicates CCP governance by introducing competing
defaulting member’s portfolio). For a brief discussion of the role played by nondefaulting members
when a member defaults, see Cecile Sourbes, CCPs Confront the Difficult Maths of Default
Management, RISK.NET (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2391889/ccpsconfront-the-difficult-maths-of-default-management (using the example of LCH.Clearnet’s handling
of the Lehman default in 2008 to explain the role that clearing members play when another member
defaults). CCPs may punish members that do not participate in good faith in the auction process by
making their contributions to the guarantee fund the first to be tapped to meet a post-auction shortfall.
See id.
254
See Angela Armakola & Jean-Paul Laurent, CCP Resilience and Clearing Membership
(Nov. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/
SSRN_ID2693427_code1859873.pdf?abstractid=2625579&mirid=1.
255

Id. at 26.

256

Id.

257

Braithwaite, supra note 71, at 12.

258

Q&A with Hal Scott of Harvard Law: Clearinghouse Ownership and Risk,
TRADEWEB.COM (Oct. 20. 2010), http://www.tradeweb.com/Blog/Q-A-With-Hal-Scott-ofHarvard-Law--Clearinghouse-Ownership-and-Risk.
259
Letter from Alexander Justham, Director, Market Division, Fin. Servs. Authority, to
David A. Stawick, Secretary, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 2 (Mar. 21, 2011).
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interests.260 Heritage Foundation scholar Norbert Michel points out that DoddFrank’s classification of CCPs as financial market utilities “marks a dangerous shift
in the relationship between government and private markets because it implies that
private financial firms cannot—or should not—competitively provide financial
services.”261 The CPSS/IOSCO principles, which heavily inform U.S. regulation,
emphasize the responsibility of financial market infrastructures to “support the
stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations,
and the objectives of relevant stakeholders,”262 and call for governance to balance the
interests of a CCP’s owners, board of directors, managers, clearing members,
regulators, and “other stakeholders.”263 Directing CCPs—in the nebulous name of
public interest—to serve multiple constituencies with potentially conflicting
objectives may have the perverse effect of destabilizing CCPs and the financial
system. CCPs that are run with a member-focus are more likely to elevate risk
management than CCPs required to consider a host of other constituencies (such as
regulators and other non-member “stakeholders”), who do not face the prospect of
absorbing CCP losses.
Third, regulators face pressure to view risk management measures as the product
of competitive machinations by dealers. In a comment letter to the CFTC, for
example, the Department of Justice argued that anti-competitive behavior in
connection with CCP access “could be explained away . . . by expressing risk
management-related concerns” and urged the CFTC to adopt stricter conflict of
interest standards for CCPs.264 This view may inform regulators’ decisions to
disallow particular risk management measures. It also helps to drive calls for
governance and ownership restrictions on CCPs.
260 Both the SEC and CFTC have proposed—but not adopted—ownership and governance
rules. See Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75
Fed. Reg. 63732 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 37, 38, 39 & 40);
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing
Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges with
Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65882 (proposed Oct.
26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) [hereinafter SEC Conflicts Proposal].
261

Michel, supra note 118, at 10.

262

CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 1.

263

Id. at 26.

264

Department of Justice, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Requirements for
Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution
Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest (Dec. 28, 2010),
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26809 [hereinafter DOJ
Comment Letter]; see also Chang, supra note 56, at 810-12 (arguing that “because big banks,
which tend to be the powerhouse derivatives dealers, control clearinghouses, there is a danger
that big banks can leverage the dominance of clearinghouses to consolidate their share in the
dealer market” and arguing for the application of the “essential facilities doctrine” for the
purpose of “clarifying when rivals of clearinghouse members might be able to pursue a private
right of action”) (footnote omitted); Kristin N. Johnson, Clearinghouse Governance: Moving
Beyond Cosmetic Reform, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681, 696-701 (2012) (arguing that large
dealer CCP members’ “rent-seeking motives” could lead CCPs to make decisions that
undermine the role of CCPs in risk mitigation).
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Many observers favor replacing dealer influence in governance and risk
management with public interest and regulatory representation. Professor
Greenberger has called for at least half of directors to be independent.265 Professor
Kristin Johnson, pointing to the “conflict between regulators’ expectations and . . .
clearinghouse owners’ priorities,”266 calls for a regulator-appointed monitor to serve
as a board watchdog who “would report directly to and receive compensation from”
regulators.267 Johnson also calls for expert directors without “material financial ties”
to serve on powerful risk management committees.268 The Department of Justice has
called for the risk management committee to be populated with a majority of
independent directors.269 Better Markets likewise advocates that a CCP’s risk
management committee “be controlled in form and substance by independent
decision-makers.”270 Under Dodd-Frank’s conflict of interest mandates, the SEC and
CFTC have contemplated individual and aggregate ownership caps and independent
director involvement in governance to temper clearing member influence.271
265

See Greenberger, supra note 52, at 265.

266

Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L.
REV. 185, 221 (2013).
267

Id. at 240.

268

Id. at 206-07.

269

DOJ Comment Letter, supra note 264, at 7.

270

Better Markets, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Requirements for Derivatives
Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the
Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest (Nov. 17, 2010), http://bettermarkets.com/sites/default/
files/documents/CFTC-%20CL-%20Conflicts%20of%20Interest%20SEFs%2C%20DCOs%201117-10.pdf.
271

The SEC proposed two alternatives: (1) CCP member ownership interest and voting
rights are capped individually at twenty percent and in the aggregate at forty percent; and at
least thirty-five percent of the board of directors and committees must be directors who are
independent of the CCP and its members, except for the nominating committee, which must
have a majority of independent directors; and (2) CCP member ownership and voting rights
are capped at five percent, a majority of all directors are independent, all members of the
nominating committee are independent, and all other committees are majority independent.
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing
Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges with
Respect to Security-Based Swaps under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65882, 65894-5902
(proposed Oct. 26, 2010). The CFTC also proposed two alternatives: (1) CCP members’ and
other large financial institutions’ voting equity is capped at twenty percent individually and
forty percent in the aggregate; and (2) CCP members’ and other large financial entities’ voting
equity is capped at 5 percent. Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations,
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of
Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63732, 63738, 63743-44 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010). The
CFTC also proposed to require that thirty-five percent, and no fewer than two, of the directors
be “public” directors. Id. at 63738. The nominating committee would have to have at least
fifty-one percent public directors, one of whom would have to be chairman. Thirty-five
percent of the risk management committee members would have to be public directors, and
ten percent would have to be customers of clearing members. Id. at 63740. For a helpful
summary and an insightful analysis of these proposals, see Sean J. Griffith, Governing
Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY
L.J. 1153, 1212-26 (2012).
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Professor Sean Griffith acknowledges that “dealers must exert a level of control over
clearinghouse operations that is commensurate with their exposure to risk through
the clearinghouse,” but advocates that CCP boards include some directors elected by
regulators to ensure systemic risk considerations are taken into account.272 Concerns
about dealer control of CCPs are understandable in light of their increasing
importance, but attempts to readjust the power dynamics at CCPs may
unintentionally destabilize them.
Fourth, regulators, faced with the expansion of CCPs, may be tempted to employ
one-size-fits-all regulations that distract CCPs from conducting their own tailored
risk management. Stress tests are one area in which this concern has arisen. CFTC
Commissioner Wetjen, although calling for “[m]ore standardized stress tests” across
jurisdictions,273 warned that “[w]hile standardization and uniformity are appealing,
they could inadvertently impede innovation and thoroughness. Would we start to
teach to the test instead of evaluating and refining the stress test methodologies as
appropriate?”274
Fifth, a prescriptive regulatory regime applicable to a small number of firms with
a vital role in the financial system seems fertile ground for regulatory capture.275
Economist George Stigler warned that, “as a rule, regulation is acquired by industry
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”276 There are a small number
of CCPs and Dodd-Frank legally mandates that they be used. There are also
relatively few large firms that serve as clearing members. Although the new
regulatory framework is burdensome for both sets of firms, they could seek to use
these burdens to their advantage in blocking entry by domestic and foreign rivals.
Alternatively, as the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee suggested, CCPs
could “exploit opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and regulatory capture to lessen
the costs of government oversight.”277 Moreover, CCPs are likely to put pressure on

272

Id. at 1221, 1235-40.

273

Mark P. Wetjen, Commissioner, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, Ensuring
the Promise of a Centrally Cleared, Glob. Swaps Mkt.: Next Steps (Dec. 4, 2014); see also
David Bailey, The Bank of England’s Perspective on CCP Risk Management, Recovery and
Resolution Arrangements, Speech at the Deutsche Boerse Group and Eurex Exchange of Ideas
Conference (Nov. 24, 2014) (calling for “[s]tandardised stress tests” to “complement more
tailored and potentially much more rigorous internal stress testing, developed and
implemented by individual CCPs”); Jerome H. Powell, Governor, Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors,
A Financial System Perspective on Central Clearing of Derivatives (Nov. 6, 2014) (“Not all
CCPs are alike. But there may be approaches that could bring some of the benefits of
standardization while allowing tailoring of some scenarios to the activities of particular CCPs
or groups of CCPs.”).
274

Wetjen, supra note 273.

275
I credit an anonymous peer reviewer for raising this concern. A full analysis of
regulatory capture in the post-Dodd-Frank derivatives markets is beyond the scope of this
piece, but would be a productive area for further research.
276 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971).
277

Edward Kane, Statement of the Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm. on The Dangers of
Substituting Foreign Compliance for US Supervision of Fin Derivatives Activity (May 13,
2013),
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/-statement-no-340-the-dangers-of-
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regulators to dissuade the use of non-cleared derivatives, which can serve as
substitutes for cleared products. The authority of multiple regulators in this space
might have the salutary effect of impeding regulatory capture, but divided regulatory
authority brings its own challenges.
Sixth, conflicts among regulators could exacerbate CCP risk by adding
complexity to CCP management. The SEC and CFTC directly regulate CCPs and the
Federal Reserve plays a back-up role under Title VIII of Dodd-Frank. The
approaches taken by these agencies are not always consistent, in part because of the
historical differences in the way the agencies oversaw CCPs.278 There have also been
calls for the involvement of the FSOC in CCP regulation.279 Moreover, because OTC
derivatives markets operate across borders, cooperation among international
regulators of CCPs is important. Relations between U.S. regulators and their foreign
counterparts were strained from the outset, because Dodd-Frank requires foreign
regulators to indemnify the CFTC if they obtain information from the commissions
about CCPs.280 Despite the common G-20 commitment to central clearing, regulators
have taken a strongly territorial approach to CCPs.281 As challenging as these
regulatory disagreements are to CCPs routinely, they could cause severe difficulties
during a crisis as regulators fight to keep assets in CCPs within their jurisdiction.282
substituting-foreign-compliance-for-us-supervision-of-financial-derivativesactivity_131454985226.pdf.
278

See, e.g., CFTC & SEC, A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON
HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION 88 (2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/
cftcjointreport101609.pdf (“The CFTC does not have clear authority, for example, to set rules
for risk management for exchanges and clearinghouses. The CFTC’s authority contrasts with
the authority of other regulators, such as the SEC or regulators in foreign jurisdictions.”).
279 See Letter from Paul Saltzman, President, Clearing House Association, LLC, to Jacob
Lew, Chairman, Financial Stability Oversight Council (Jan. 9, 2015) (“[T]he FSOC [should]
coordinate and work with its member agencies with authority over CCPs to strengthen the
ability of CCPs to mitigate and manage systemic risks arising from CCP operations.”). But see
Letter from Terrence A. Duffy et al., Executive Chairman and President, CME Group, to
Jacob L. Lew, Chairman, Financial Stability Oversight Council (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.optionsclearing.com/components/docs/about/press/comment-letters/20150309FSOC.pdf (arguing against the one-size-fits-all regulation that might be introduced by active
FSOC involvement in CCP regulatory issues).
280

Dodd-Frank Act § 725(e) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(k)(5) (2012)).

281 See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 37, at 11 (“In the majority of cases, CCPs are
authorized to clear products in a given asset class in only one or two jurisdictions. Only in the
case of interest rate derivatives are there a couple of CCPs that are concurrently authorised in
four or more jurisdictions. The limited extent of cross-border availability of CCPs is a
potential challenge for the further expansion of central clearing of OTC derivatives, given that
most jurisdictions require that a given CCP be locally authorised if it is to be used for meeting
that jurisdiction’s central clearing requirements.”).
282
See, e.g., Wendt, supra note 167, at 12 (“International coordination among authorities
will be challenging, in case of a default impacting multiple jurisdictions, as interests may
differ. The home authority may give priority to maintaining the CCP’s operations, whereas the
authorities of other countries may prioritize the stability of their financial system or local
banks.”); see also Kay Swinburne, Member of the European Parliament, Speech Before the
World
Federation
of
Exchanges/IOMA
Conference
(May
5,
2015),
http://www.kayswinburne.co.uk/articles/SpeechWFEIOMA050515/559 (“[I do not] want to
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As clearing mandates take hold around the world, the pressure for linkages among
CCPs is likely to grow,283 which will only further complicate regulatory oversight.
Finally, the desire to increase the proportion of cleared swaps is likely to affect
regulators’ oversight of key risk management decisions. Decisions related to
margin—methods used to determine how much is collected, the form margin may
take, and how it is invested—are one area in which regulators’ perspectives could be
colored by their excessively pro-clearing bent. If margins are set improperly, the
CCP may be at risk.284 Regulatory pressure may reinforce competitive pressures; if
margins are set too high, market participants may seek out other CCPs.285
Alternatively, firms might retain risks instead of entering into highly margined
derivatives transactions. As Paul Tucker argues, CCPs may have a natural inclination
to behave pro-cyclically by “shading margins to the downside during normal times
to help sustain market growth or market share, and tightening sharply as and when
conditions deteriorate.”286 Market participants may urge regulators to pressure CCPs
to keep margins down, and regulators may assent to retain broad support for
clearing. Margining methodologies are complex and model-based,287 and how best to
set margins is matter of great debate among academics288 and regulators.289 Because
see a scenario where the banking regulator of a large clearing member refuses to allow that
member to participate in refills of a CCPs default fund as it is concerned about that bank
having enough capital to refill one of its own domestically supervised CCPs”).
283

Linking can take different forms. See, e.g., IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY
REPORT, supra note 30, at 114.
284 See id. at 108 (discussing CCP failures and highlighting the role that failure to properly
increase margin requirements played in the failures of the French Caisse de Liquidation, the
Malaysian Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House, and the Hong Kong Futures
Exchange).
285 See, e.g., Nicole Abruzzo & Yang-Ho Park, An Empirical Analysis of Futures Margin
Changes: Determinants and Policy Implications 24 (Fed. Res. Bd. Fin. and Econ. Discussion
Paper
No.
2014-86,
2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/
files/201486pap.pdf (finding “that margin changes can be partly explained by competition
even after changes in other margin determinants are controlled for” and that “competition
among CCPs can make overall margin requirements inappropriately lax”). They also note that
CCPs can compete not only based on margin levels, but “in terms of acceptable collateral,
haircut rates, or guaranty fund contributions.” Id. at 25.
286

Tucker, supra note 206.

287

For a glimpse into margin-setting methodologies, see ICE CLEAR CREDIT, ICE CDS
MARGIN CALCULATOR ICE LINK GUI (Aug. 2014), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/
clear_credit/ICE_CDS_Margin_Calculator_Presentation.pdf.
288

Trade-offs in setting margin or collateral arise in both the cleared and uncleared
contexts. A full discussion of these trade-offs is beyond the scope of this article, but these
issues have been discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Rajna Gibson Brandon & Carsten Murawski,
Margining in the Derivatives Markets and the Stability of the Banking Sector, 37 J. BANKING
& FIN. 1119 (2013). CCPs face some unique issues in margin-setting. See, e.g., Thorsten V.
Koeppl, Time for Stability in Derivatives Markets—A New Look at Central Clearing for
Securities Markets, C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENTARY, No. 329, May 2011, at 20 (“Collateral
can basically serve two functions: as an incentive device to decrease risk-taking or as an
insurance device against counterparty default. A CCP can save on collateral since it provides
cheaper insurance in the form of novation and mutualization of losses. But a CCP needs to
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there is not a widely accepted formula for setting margin, there is a lot of room for
non-risk considerations to affect regulators’ views on margin methodologies. Wibaut
and Wilford point out, for example, that regulators’ role in setting the type of margin
that CCPs can accept could be influenced by the same forces that drove regulators to
treat German and Greek bonds as equivalent.290 Consequences of regulatory mistakes
may not manifest themselves until a crisis.
Another example where the desire to move swaps into CCPs may color
regulators’ view of key risk management issues is what, if any, role a CCP’s own
capital should play in absorbing losses from member defaults and how CCP
resolution should be handled. On the one hand, members argue that CCPs must face
consequences from member defaults so that they can take adequate measures to
prevent them from happening.291 On the other hand, CCPs are likely to resist having
regulators mandate contributions by CCPs.292 Regulators are likely to look for the
approach that imposes the least additional immediate cost on clearing services, even
if that approach does not reflect the allocation of risk most conducive to sound risk
management. To keep clearing cheap, regulators may tolerate large uncovered risks
with the expectation that taxpayers will bear losses when the crisis comes. This
temptation leads to a final problem—the specter of a future government bailout.
F. Bailout Risk
In an era of clearing mandates, a shuttered CCP could devastate markets as
market participants must centrally clear transactions subject to the clearing mandate.
If the CCP shut down, market participants would not be able to transact in products
subject to the clearing mandate unless there were a competing CCP clearing those
products. Clearing members and their regulators therefore will have a strong interest
in keeping a CCP that has gotten to the end of its default waterfall up and running.293
rely more heavily on collateral to limit incentives for risk-taking. Hence, collateral
requirements might very well increase significantly with CCP clearing as pointed out by some
large dealers.”).
289
See, e.g., Verena Ross, Exec. Dir., European Securities and Markets Authority,
Keynote Speech at IDX 2015 (June 9, 2015) (arguing that the CFTC’s proposed one-day
margin period of risk for clearing members’ accounts is insufficient to protect CCPs and their
nondefaulting members if a member defaults); Timothy G. Massad, Chairman, Remarks
Before the European Union Parliament, Committee on Economics (May 6, 2015),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/opamass
ad-20.pdf (arguing that CFTC’s one-day margining approach may actually lead to higher
margin than Europe’s two-day margin period because the CFTC does not allow netting of
customer margin as European regulators do); see also Cecile Sourbes & Kris Devasabai,
Regulators to Put CCP Risks Under Microscope, RISK.NET (May 7, 2015) (“[CCP] [m]argin
models have long been a source of controversy.”).
290

Wibaut & Wilford, supra note 148, at 108 n.7.

291

See Letter from Paul Saltzman to Jacob Lew, supra note 279.

292

Letter from Terrence A. Duffy to Jacob L. Lew, supra note 279 (“Although our CCPs
have very different default management waterfalls, we all agree that because CCPs are not
principal risk-taking institutions and because their continuation as institutions depends upon
effective risk management and default management programs, there is no ‘moral hazard’ to be
cured by mandating a specific or uniform approach to CCP contributions.”).
293

See supra Table 1.
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Demands for contributions to resuscitate a failing CCP, however, are likely to come
at a time of market stress, when clearing members are facing many other claims on
their assets, particularly their liquid assets.
If clearing members could not prop up a CCP, presumably the government that
imposes the clearing mandate and supervises CCPs would go to great lengths to keep
them in operation. A CCP failure would reflect badly on CCP’s regulators.294 The
potential availability of government support for a failing CCP is reflected in DoddFrank in two ways. First, Dodd-Frank’s drafters did not seem to expect that CCPs
would be eligible for the orderly liquidation authority in Title II of Dodd-Frank. The
orderly liquidation authority, a centerpiece of Dodd-Frank, is an alternative to
bankruptcy for resolving large financial institutions. Whether a CCP could be
resolved under Title II is at best ambiguous. Title II does not explicitly cover CCPs.
Professor Lubben convincingly argues that both the language and logic of Title II
exclude CCPs from its reach.295
The second way is in authority given to the Federal Reserve. Title VIII gives the
Federal Reserve the authority to loan money through the discount window to
systemically important CCPs in “unusual or exigent circumstances.”296 Dodd-Frank
also allows the Federal Reserve to establish accounts for systemically important
CCPs and provide services to them such as currency and coin services, check
clearing and collection services, wire transfer services, automated clearinghouse
services, settlement services, securities safekeeping services, and Federal Reserve
294

Kane, supra note 277.

295

Stephen J. Lubben, Failure of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank’s Fatal Flaw?, 23-24
VA. L. & BUS. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/
SSRN_ID2652011_code108302.pdf?abstractid=2652011&mirid=1
[hereinafter
Lubben,
Failure of the Clearinghouse] (arguing that CCPs likely are not encompassed in the list of
companies that can proceed through resolution and that, had CCPs been intended to be
covered, the CFTC would have been granted a role in deciding whether a CCP should be put
into the orderly liquidation authority); see also Darrell Duffie, Financial Market
Infrastructure: Too Important to Fail 3 (Hoover Inst. Econ. Working Paper No. 14101, 2014)
(discussing questions about whether Title II, particularly as interpreted by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, applies to CCPs ). Julia Allen has come to a different legal conclusion
about the applicability of Title II to CCPs, but argues that “[T]he logistical complexities of
applying the Orderly Liquidation Authority procedures to an insolvent clearinghouse make
government intervention before initiation of the receivership process the most likely
outcome.” Allen, supra note 153, at 1103.
296
Dodd-Frank Act § 806(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465 (2012)) (“The Board of
Governors may authorize a Federal Reserve Bank . . . to provide a designated financial market
utility discount and borrowing privileges only in unusual or exigent circumstances, upon the
affirmative vote of a majority of the Board of Governors . . . after consultation with the
Secretary, and upon a showing by the designated financial market utility that it is unable to
secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.”); see also Baker,
supra note 152, at 180 (“The failure of a systemically significant clearinghouse could be
catastrophic. It would threaten widespread, domino-like disruptions of critical money flows
that its members and other financial institutions count on to meet their own financial
obligations all over the world. Intervention by a government backstop—a last resort
clearinghouse—would likely be needed to avert the collapse of a systemically significant
clearinghouse. Due to critical but little understood reforms in Title VIII, the Federal Reserve
can now assume this role in certain situations.”).
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float.297 Emergency liquidity assistance need not be a bailout; if properly
collateralized and made at a penalty interest rate, a loan to a solvent CCP could be an
efficient way for the Federal Reserve to support the functioning of the financial
system during a crisis.298 As Professor Lubben points out, however, “it might not
even be possible to know at the time discount window lending happens if it
constitutes a bailout.”299 The Federal Reserve’s use of lending programs in past
crises illustrates how difficult it is to know whether a loan constitutes a bailout.300
The availability of emergency lending may pose a risk as it could breed
carelessness by both CCPs and regulators. The Federal Reserve’s past use of
emergency lending has created expectations that the Federal Reserve would not
hesitate to engage in emergency lending in the future.301 Manmohan Singh points out
that the availability of emergency liquidity support “may lead to moral hazard that
may manifest itself, for example, in CCPs not requiring full collateral from their
existing members/clients, quite possibly with the acquiescence of regulators.”302
Likewise, Professor Colleen Baker argues that, “the very presence of a potential
central bank backstop for systemically significant clearinghouses—essentially the
possibility of catastrophic liquidity insurance—creates a significant moral hazard.”303
Regulators may view emergency lending as a backstop for subpar regulatory efforts.
If regulators have acquiesced in or encouraged CCP under-margining, inadequate
guaranty funds, or some other risk-management misstep, they are particularly likely
297

Dodd-Frank Act § 806(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465 (2012)).

298

See, e.g., Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swap Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk:
Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 49, 79 (2011) (“[D]irect CCP access to emergency lending is more efficient and
equitable, and thus superior, to the Federal Reserve lending indirectly through CCP
members”). The likelihood that the provision will be used for a bailout may be increased by
the fact that—as Baker points out—the phrasing, “unusual or exigent circumstances” is
broader than the “unusual and exigent circumstances” used in the Federal Reserve’s
emergency lending authority under Section 13(3) [12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2012)]. Baker,
supra note 152, at 180 n.38.
299
Stephen J. Lubben, Nationalize the Clearinghouses 29 (Seton Hall Public L. Res.,
Working
Paper
No.
2458506,
2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/
SSRN_ID2458506_code108302.pdf?abstractid=2458506&mirid=1
[hereinafter
Lubben,
Nationalize the Clearinghouses]. Lubben elsewhere argues that a customized bailout, such as
was used for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, might be crafted for a CCP in the heat of a crisis.
Lubben, Failure of the Clearinghouse, supra note 295, at 28-30.
300 The Federal Reserve, for example, lent to American International Group in 2008, even
though there were serious questions about whether the company was solvent. See Peirce,
supra note 10, at 38.
301 See, e.g., Renee Haltom & Jeffrey M. Lacker, Should the Fed Have a Financial
Stability Mandate? Lessons from the Fed’s First 100 Years, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
RICHMOND 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (“Government-lending programs often appeared to
stabilize markets because they confirmed hopes of intervention, and so have been hailed as
successes. But this has come at the cost of moral hazard, greater risk-taking, and greater
instability down the road.”).
302

Singh, supra note 154, at 17.

303

Baker, supra note 152, at 184.
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to be pressured to bail out a failing CCP. If problems emanate from products or
participants in CCPs because of a clearing mandate, regulators will likewise face
bailout pressure.
Even without express Dodd-Frank language on which to rely, the regulatory
structure that has forced risks into CCPs brings with it an implicit government
guarantee. Ben Bernanke argued against worrying too much about a breakdown in
clearing in the futures market because “the government, especially the central bank,
should be thought of as part of the system.”304 He goes on to explain that:
[T]here are actions that the government can take (and likely will take, for
political economy reasons) to protect the clearing and settlement systems,
should they be in danger. When the financial system is conceived broadly
to include the government as the “insurer of last resort,” the current
institutional setup seems satisfactorily robust to the threat of financial
crisis.305
Bernanke concludes that in 1987, “[t]he Federal Reserve’s gamble paid off.”306
Although written before he became Federal Reserve Chairman and before the
clearing mandate took hold, this view of the government, as the insurer of last resort
for clearinghouses, seems to invite market participants to anticipate government
intervention if a CCP runs into trouble. Messages to the contrary are important,307
but may not overcome the market expectations grounded in the experience of the last
crisis, the many financial company bailouts that preceded it, and the intense
involvement of government in modern-day clearing. Professor Lubben shares
Chairman Bernanke’s certainty that the government would step in to bail out a CCP
“because the important, central place of clearinghouses after Dodd-Frank makes
their failure too disruptive to be politically tolerated.”308 Professor Lubben calls for
making the bailout explicit ex ante through the statutory establishment of an orderlyliquidation-authority type mechanism run by the Federal Reserve.309
The economics of clearing suggest that certain CCPs may act as de facto
monopolies in particular asset classes310—a fact that makes a bailout more likely if
one of these key CCPs were to fail. If only one CCP clears a product that is subject
304

Bernanke, supra 172, at 145.

305

Id. at 145-46.

306

Id. at 148.

307

Powell, supra note 273 (advising “CCPs and their members” that they “must plan to
stand on their own and continue to provide critical services to the financial system, without
support from the taxpayer”).
308

Lubben, Nationalize the Clearinghouses, supra note 299. Elsewhere, Lubben explains
that “the government should expressly state clearinghouses that ultimately fail will be
nationalized, with specific consequences to investors, and an expectation of member
participation in the recapitalization of the clearinghouse, once that becomes systemically
viable.” Lubben, supra note 295.
309

Lubben, Nationalize the Clearinghouses, supra note 299, at 301.

310

See, e.g., Capponi & Cheng, supra note 234 (“[T]here is a large cost of entry to the
clearing business, and clearing is currently segregated among asset classes and concentrated
within a few clearinghouses, granting them significant market power.”).
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to a clearing mandate,311 markets will not be able to function as usual if the CCP
ceases to exist. Transactions in a product subject to a clearing mandate cannot
lawfully occur unless there is a CCP that accepts that product. Consequently, the
government will be under intense pressure to rescue and resuscitate a failing CCP.312
An alternative would be for the government to encourage another already operational
and healthy CCP that clears other types of products to begin clearing the products
formerly cleared by the failing CCP. Such an expansion, however, would likely take
considerable time as it would require the expanding CCP to analyze the risk
associated with the new product and any new clearing members, determine how it
will manage that risk, and gain regulatory approval to clear the product.
A possible rejoinder to the concern about bailouts is that CCPs rarely fail. There
have been failures, however, and today’s more complex CCPs distorted by clearing
mandates and attendant regulation are not immune from failure. Past failures include
the Caisse de Liquidation in 1974, the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House in
1983, and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Clearing Corp. in 1987.313 In each case,
the problem related to margin issues.314 Brazil’s BM&F CCP almost failed in 1999
when there was inadequate margin after a real devaluation caused two clearing
members to default.315 The Bank of England’s Paul Tucker described the severe
fallout from the Hong Kong failure:
[T]he Hong Kong Futures Exchange clearing house (and its guarantee
corporation) failed in the wake of the global stock market crash in 1987.
The Futures Exchange had to close. Traders faced margin calls on cash
market equity positions but, with the futures market closed and the
clearing house bust, they could not get margin moneys returned on
profitable futures positions. For that and other reasons, the stock market
closed too. Hong Kong’s main capital market shut down. Reopening the
exchanges was no small feat. Ultimately, Hong Kong taxpayers, together
with the clearing banks, put up the funds to underpin the Futures
Exchange.316
More recently, in December 2013, a Korean CCP dipped into its guaranty fund
after one of its members—a small broker-dealer—defaulted because of a trading
311

To avoid this problem and allow a CCP to fail, BlackRock has recommended that the
clearing mandate only apply to products cleared by two or more CCPs. See BLACKROCK,
supra note 198.
312
BlackRock described the dilemma that market participants will face if a CCP fails:
“[G]iven that the CCP’s business is risk management, its failure is a failure of risk
management of such proportion that market participants, especially those that are fiduciaries,
are unlikely to put new risk positions on that would be cleared through a CCP attempting to
recover, especially if there margin is at risk.” Id.
313 Hills et al., supra note 62, at 129-30 (providing a helpful discussion of the causes of
each CCP failure); MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 210; see also GREGORY, supra
note 59, at 267-70 (discussing historical CCP failures and near failures).
314

IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 30, at 18 (highlighting the role
that failure to properly increase margin requirements played in the CCP failures).
315

See QUARRY ET AL., supra note 90, at 6.

316

Tucker, supra note 160, at 180.
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error.317 Sixty members, including JPMorgan, absorbed more than $40 million in
losses by replenishing the guaranty fund.318 To the displeasure of these members, the
CCP had a default waterfall that provided for tapping the guaranty fund before the
CCP bears any of the loss.319 Even though the default happened during a period of
relative calm, some members required a several month grace period to make their
payments.320 During a crisis, it is even more unlikely that members would be able to
pay promptly. Problems at CCPs emerge quickly and come with a high price tag—
precisely the scenario on which government bailouts are built.
III. A BETTER APPROACH TO MANAGING RISK
To achieve greater financial stability and serve markets effectively, the current
top-down regulatory framework for OTC derivatives needs to be replaced with a
regulatory approach that leaves decisions about clearing and the consequences of
those decisions in the private sector. The new structure would not include clearing
mandates or associated trading mandates. Provisions designating CCPs systemically
important and providing them access to Federal Reserve backstops would likewise
not be part of the new structure. The new regulatory structure would instead allow
market participants to choose central clearing and substitute a principles-based
regulatory approach for the current increasingly prescriptive approach to CCP
regulation. A comprehensive reporting regime for cleared and uncleared swaps
would ensure that firms and their regulators have better sight into where derivatives
exposures are than they did in the last crisis.
A. Elimination of the Clearing Mandate
The first step toward enhancing financial stability is to eliminate the clearing
mandate. Admittedly, doing so would be a stark departure from one of the core
features of Dodd-Frank’s derivatives framework. Nevertheless, it is necessary to
ensure that the regulatory framework does not become the source of a future crisis.
To effectively eliminate the mandate, capital, and margin incentives to clear, also
need to be eliminated. The mandate, together with other regulatory nudges to clear,
impedes market participants’ ability to make choices. These market participants,
317

Kanga Kong, Trading Error Leaves Korean Broker Scrambling, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18,
2013),
http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/12/18/trading-error-leaves-korean-brokerscrambling; Viren Vaghela, Korea Clearing Structure in Question After HanMag Trading
Error, RISK.NET (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.risk.net/asia-risk/feature/2331225/korea-clearingstructure-in-question-after-hanmag-trading-error; Yi Whan-woo, HanMag Debacle Hits
Brokerages, KOREA TIMES (Dec. 17, 2013), http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/
2013/12/602_148108.html.
318

Vaghela, supra note 317.

319

Id.; Wetjen, supra note 273 (“The clearinghouse used a portion of its guaranty fund to
cover the defaulter’s losses, which resulted in clearing members losing some portion of their
default-fund contributions; the clearinghouse itself did not suffer a loss because its skin in the
game came after the non-defaulting members’ contributions . . . . That losses occurred at all
served as a wakeup call for firms who are members of multiple Central Counterparties (CCPs)
around the globe.”).
320
Vaghela, supra note 317 (“On January 20, most members of the exchange replenished
the default fund with KRX offering some flexibility until March as a final deadline to make
payment.”).
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who may be better informed than regulators and CCPs,321 are well positioned to
make choices consistent with strong risk management and customer needs. As Paul
McBride points out, much can be done with “voluntary, rather than compulsory
clearing, [which enables] market participants . . . to exercise discretion in order to
strike the optimal balance between the costs and benefits of clearing.”322 Eliminating
the mandate would also ease concerns that a failing CCP would lock up markets
since market participants would be able to continue trading uncleared products
without running afoul of a clearing mandate.
It is likely that CCPs would continue to clear many of the swaps that they
currently clear and add new products to meet organic market demand for central
clearing. Even before Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandate was put in place, some OTC
derivatives were being centrally cleared because of market interest in central
clearing.323 Affording market participants the ability to choose whether to clear
would allow them to avoid risky CCPs and exercise leverage to improve the riskmanagement of poor CCPs. In contrast to the current model where, once a mandate
is in place, CCPs have a government-granted privilege, a mandate-less model would
give CCPs an incentive to earn customer business by managing risk well.324
The trading mandate, which was established by Dodd-Frank as a companion of
the clearing mandate, should likewise be eliminated. As with clearing, market
participants will choose to trade on established platforms based on a wide variety of
considerations that they are best positioned to balance. The swap execution facilities
called into life by Dodd-Frank would continue to exist, if they meet organic market
demand.
B. Principles-Based Regulation
The elimination of the clearing mandate would not eliminate CCPs or the need
for regulatory oversight. Primary responsibility for designing and running CCPs
should remain with the CCP’s owners and members. A prescriptive regulatory
regime inappropriately shifts this responsibility to regulators by placing the full array
of risk management decisions in their hands. CCPs therefore should be subject to a
principles-based regulatory regime that allows CCPs broad discretion to operate
within the principles in the manner that best suits the products they clear and the
market participants they serve. Within this framework, they must have the room to
321

Pirrong, Bill of Goods, supra note 148, at 48 (“Dealers have a strong incentive to
develop accurate models because the models enable the dealers to quantify and manage their
market risk more effectively, price their derivatives more accurately and earn trading profits
as a result, and evaluate the default risk posed by customers.”).
322

McBride, supra note 187, at 1121-22.

323

Culp, supra note 29, at 103 (noting that CCPs started clearing OTC derivatives in the
late 1990s); Randall S. Kroszner, Central Counterparty Clearing: History, Innovation, and
Regulation, 30 ECON. PERSP. 37, 39 (2006).
324 The notion that clearing members do not care about CCP risk is belied by the
widespread industry concern about uncapped exposures to CCP risk. See, e.g., Letter from
Paul Saltzman to Jacob L. Lew, supra note 279 (remarking that The Clearing House
Association “[c]ontinues to share the serious concerns raised by regulators regarding the need
to address and mitigate systemic risks presented by all CCPs” and detailing concerns and
recommendations for improved risk management). Involving clearing members in CCP risk
management decisions is, therefore, important.
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make swift changes to operational, technical, or risk management procedures as
weaknesses emerge, risks are better understood, or available technology improves.
Even in the absence of a clearing mandate, the temptation to micromanage CCPs
for the sake of financial stability is understandable, but unwise. Increasingly
prescriptive regulation can have the perverse effect of frustrating effective and
adaptive CCP risk management, dulling clearing member monitoring of CCPs, and
homogenizing CCPs so that all are subject to similar vulnerabilities. As former
Federal Reserve Governor Randall Kroszner explained, “more intense government
regulation of CCPs may prove counterproductive if it creates moral hazard or
impedes the ability of CCPs to develop new approaches to risk management.”325
To allow CCPs discretion, core principles should be broad. Without prescribing
particular approaches, they should require CCPs to have and disclose publicly
policies governing topics including member obligations, the complete default
waterfall, risk management, governance, resolution and recovery procedures, and
margin methodologies. The CPSS/IOSCO risk management principles and other
relevant principles can inform CCPs’ compliance with the core principles.
As described above, the manner in which the SEC and CFTC oversee CCPs
differs; the CFTC relies more heavily on self-certification by CCPs and the SEC
takes a more active role in rule approvals.326 Title VIII of Dodd-Frank partially
eliminates this difference for designated CCPs by requiring that they get preapproval for material changes to rules, procedures, and operations.327 In addition,
Dodd-Frank gives the Federal Reserve a consultative role with respect to such rule
changes.328 Regulators should have regulatory authority over CCPs, but their role
should not consist of regulatory micromanagement of CCPs. Instead, CCPs would be
allowed to self-certify rules as compliant with the relevant core principles.329 Rule
changes would have to be transparent and could be abrogated in the event the CCP’s
regulator, informed by public comment, found the rule to violate core principles.
Regulators could continue to monitor CCPs for improper practices. Professor
Pirrong has called for regulators to be able to revise membership requirements if
they “can show that they were adopted for anti-competitive reasons, or place an
undue burden on competition not justified by any prudential benefit.”330 This
principle makes sense applied more broadly to other CCP risk management and
operational measures.

325

Kroszner, supra note 323, at 37.

326

See supra Part I.A.

327

Dodd-Frank Act § 806(e) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465(e) (2012)).

328

Id. § 806(e)(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465(e)(4) (2012)).

329
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE 116 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/
Blueprint.pdf (“Treasury also recommends that all clearing agency and market SROs, and
other SROs as the SEC deems appropriate, be permitted by statute to self-certify all
rulemakings (except those involving corporate listing and market conduct standards), which
then become effective upon filing. The SEC should retain its right to abrogate the rulemakings
at any time.”).
330

Pirrong, Economics of Central Clearing, supra note 203, at 28-29.
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To augment regulatory oversight of CCPs, CCPs could obtain private
insurance331 or issue systemic risk bonds. Either of these approaches would introduce
supplemental outside monitoring for CCPs, in addition to the monitoring provided
by regulators and members whose guaranty fund contributions are on the line and
who are potentially subject to additional losses through, for example, supplemental
assessments and variation margin gains haircutting.
C. Properly Aligned CCP Ownership and Governance
CCPs are most likely to serve the public interest of promoting financial stability
if their ownership and governance structures correspond to economic interests.
Randall Kroszner has explained that, “market forces can produce private regulations
that address the concerns about safety, soundness, and broader financial stability.”332
As traditionally constructed, clearinghouses were a group of financial firms that
pooled their risks, managed them jointly, and shared any losses. Risk management
was an essential ingredient of such an arrangement.333 CCP control restrictions of the
sort contemplated by Dodd-Frank that would prohibit such an arrangement are illconsidered.334 As a result of demutualization, today’s CCPs tend to not to be
member-owned; most CCPs are affiliated with an exchange.335 Clearing members,
however, continue to be the primary loss-bearers when they fail. Consequently, as
331
Some have proposed insurance to cover potential losses at the end of the default
waterfall. See, e.g., Matthew Leising, Catastrophe Prevention Drives Pitch to Congress,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0311/catastrophe-prevention-drives-insurance-pitch-to-clearinghouses (describing formation of
an insurance consortium to offer insurance to clearinghouses).
332

Kroszner, supra note 323, at 38.

333 See, e.g., IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 30, at 16 (noting that
a race to the risk management bottom “will be counteracted provided that users, who bear the
risk of each other’s default, have a sufficient voice in governance and particularly if the CCP
is user-owned”); Kroszner, supra note 323, at 38 (“The mutualization of risk creates
incentives for all of the exchange’s members to support the imposition of risk controls that
limit the extent to which the trading activities of any individual member expose all of [the]
other members to losses from defaults. Moreover, because members own the clearinghouse,
they have the capability to act on their incentives for effective CCP risk management.”).
334 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 726 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8323 (2012)) (“[The CFTC is
permitted to] adopt rules which may include numerical limits on the control of, or the voting
rights with respect to, any derivatives clearing organization that clears swaps . . . by a bank
holding company . . . with total consolidated assets of $50,000,000,000 or more, a nonbank
financial company . . . supervised by the Board, an affiliate of such a bank holding company
or nonbank financial company, a swap dealer, major swap participant, or associated person of
a swap dealer or major swap participant.”).
335

See, e.g., Domanski et al., supra note 163, at 63 (“In 83% of the cases, CCPs are
directly owned or managed by the company operating the stock exchange.”); Douglas D.
Evanoff, et al., Policymakers, Researchers, and Practitioners Discuss the Role of Central
Counterparties, in THE ROLE OF CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 12 (2007),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/rolecentralcounterparties200707en.pdf?2973e97f82
1d65505808bd2a9662560e (noting that, “[i]n the U.S., there has been a recent movement
away from the traditional model of mutual ownership of exchanges and their clearing and
settlement providers, toward a for-profit, stock ownership,” which “could have a potential
impact on the incentive structure and, possibly, the risk aversion of the organizations”).
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others have argued, clearing members must play a role in managing CCPs and
designing them.336 Regulations should accommodate and encourage active member
involvement in CCP oversight.
Although the mutual ownership CCP model is attractive for financial stability
reasons, the for-profit model that dominates the swaps landscape can work once the
clearing mandate is eliminated. CCPs will no longer have an essentially guaranteed
stream of business, which will give market participants more leverage to influence
CCP risk management practices. Members will be reluctant to use a CCP that
exposes them to large risk. Now the only option for clearing members concerned
about poor CCP risk management is to cease trading products subject to clearing
mandates.
The suggestion that members, whose money is on the line in the default fund,
must play a central role in risk management, runs directly counter to the
recommendations of others who worry about the undue control that dealers exercise
in CCPs.337 These commentators worry that, if permitted, large dealers will limit
entry to CCPs and prevent them from accepting products for clearing in order to
keep products in the more profitable bilateral market.338 They call for ownership and
governance restrictions of the sort permitted by Dodd-Frank and proposed by the
SEC and CFTC.339 They want to replace the voices of clearing members with those
of public interest directors in risk management and other key committees.340
Concerns about dealer control of the swaps market are not baseless, but risk
336 See, e.g., Hills et al., supra note 62, at 130 (noting that if risk monitoring incentives are
to be effective, “providers of the central counterparty’s guarantee fund or other capital should
also be its owners, or at least . . . management should be accountable to them in some way”);
Kroszner, supra note 323, at 39 (“[G]overnance arrangements must provide those with ‘skin
in the game’ with substantial influence over the CCP’s risk controls.”); Pirrong, Economics of
Central Clearing, supra note 203, at 26 (arguing that “[t]hose who bear the counterparty risks
assumed by a CCP should have the power to make decisions that affect the riskiness of the
CCP, and the distribution of that risk”); Hal Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the
United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 701 (2010) (arguing against
ownership and control restrictions that “[w]ould limit the ability of swap dealers and major
swap participants, who are the parties with the greatest expertise in risk management, to
exercise influence over the policies and operations of a clearinghouse”).
337

See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 52, at 245 (arguing for strong limits on the economic
interests of swap dealers in CCPs).
338
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 266, at 222-25 (arguing that large swap dealers have
incentives to limit CCP membership and product eligibility).
339
See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 52, at 245 (“[T]he CFTC should strengthen its
proposed governance standards for DCOs in order to safeguard swap users’ access to clearing
against the possibility that the CFTC’s participant eligibility requirements fail to increase
DCO membership.”) (footnote omitted); Johnson, supra note 258, at 239-40 (arguing for
board monitor or observer to provide a link between CCP boards and regulators).
340

See, e.g., TURBEVILLE, supra note 79, at 13 (“At a minimum, the public’s interest
should be represented by membership on the risk committees of major clearinghouses.
Regulatory representation, or representation by other public interest organization, would
legitimize the process . . . .”); DOJ Comment Letter, supra note 264, at 7 (calling for one
hundred percent independent directors on nominating committees and majority independent
risk management and executive committees).
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management will suffer if the people who bear the risks are not also able to
determine how best to manage them. Regulatory principles should encourage the
involvement of knowledgeable experts in CCP management and oversight.
Prohibitions against anticompetitive activity modeled on existing statutory
prohibitions should suffice to prevent CCPs from being used for improper
competitive purposes. For example, DCOs are prohibited from “adopt[ing] any rule
or tak[ing] any action that results in any unreasonable restraint of trade; or
impos[ing] any material anticompetitive burden . . . [u]nless necessary or appropriate
to achieve the purposes of this chapter.”341 That language could be modified to
enable regulators to abrogate CCP rules or other actions upon demonstrating that the
action was being undertaken for anticompetitive reasons rather than bolstering the
soundness of the CCP.342 The task of identifying improper anticompetitive behavior
is best left to the functional regulators, rather than to the realm of antitrust law.343
D. End Implicit and Explicit Promises of Bailouts
For the sake of financial stability, regulatory changes should be made to end
bailout expectations. As Kroszner explains, “promises[s] of government financial
support in the event of a risk-management failure” can “eviscerate[] . . . privatemarket discipline, which has served private and public interests in the stability of
CCP arrangements so well for so long.”344 The government should eliminate explicit
and implicit government guarantees on CCPs.
Central to eliminating government guarantees is ending the FSOC’s power to
designate systemically important financial market utilities under Title VIII of DoddFrank. The designation carries with it an implicit message that the government will
not let designated entities fail. It also affords designated CCPs access to Federal
Reserve accounts and services, which will enable the Federal Reserve to subtly prop
up a failing CCP in a future crisis. All of these Title VIII provisions should be

341 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(N)(2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b)(3)(I)((2013) (“The rules
of the clearing agency do not impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of this title.”).
342

As noted earlier, Pirrong called for something similar with respect to membership
measures. Pirrong, Economics of Central Clearing, supra note 203, at 28-29 (calling for
regulators to be able to revise membership requirements if the regulators “can show that they
were adopted for anti-competitive reasons, or place an undue burden on competition not
justified by any prudential benefit”).
343 The Supreme Court’s reasoning for not allowing an antitrust suit to proceed in Credit
Suisse v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007), which related to initial public offering underwriter
syndicates, seems applicable here:

[T]he difficulty of drawing a complex, sinuous line separating securities-permitted
from securities-forbidden conduct, the need for securities-related expertise to draw
that line, the likelihood that litigating parties will depend upon the same evidence yet
expect courts to draw different inferences from it, and the serious risk that antitrust
courts will produce inconsistent results that, in turn, will overly deter syndicate
practices important in the marketing of new issues.
Id. at 285.
344

Kroszner, supra note 323, at 40.
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eliminated. The provision of emergency liquidity to solvent CCP members can
address temporary liquidity problems at a CCP.
The elimination of the clearing mandate also would help to send the message that
the government is not a CCP guarantor. As long as the government requires market
participants to use CCPs, market participants will anticipate a government bailout.
Removing the mandate and other incentives to clear would undercut bailout
expectations.
Finally, regulators should encourage private sector efforts involving CCPs and
their members to define CCPs’ default waterfalls clearly, realistically explore tail
risks, and plan for recapitalization and resolution in the event of failure due to
defaults or non-default problems (for example, operational issues).345 At the core of
all of these is a need to understand as well as possible what a CCP’s worst-case
exposures would be, although there will always be some measure of uncertainty
around tail risk. Deciding how much of these potential exposures should be
prefunded through initial margin and guaranty fund contributions is the next step. To
the extent that some of the exposure remains unfunded, the CCP must map out a plan
for covering it through member assessments, variation margin gains haircuts, or tearups. As scholar David Elliott points out, most CCPs have recognized that retaining
unlimited authority to call for member cash contributions is not realistic because
members might not pay in a timely fashion and regulatory constraints prevent
clearing members from taking on uncapped risks.346 Although current conversations
about these issues have been spurred by the increase in clearing brought about by the
clearing mandate, they are valuable in the absence of a mandate. Credible plans by
CCPs to deal with failures in risk management or operational systems are a critical
part of eliminating implicit expectations of government bailouts.
E. Regulatory Reporting Requirements
One of the concerns during the last crisis was that regulators did not have a good
picture of the OTC derivatives market. Even market participants did not have a good
view of their own exposures because of trade backlogs.347 CCPs provide a discipline
345
For thoughtful discussions of these issues, see, for example, COMM. ON PAYMENTS &
MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES & BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, RECOVERY OF FINANCIAL
MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES (2014), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d121.pdf (comments on the
report are available at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/comments/d109/overview.htm); Darrell
Duffie, Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties (Stan. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working
Paper No. 3256, 2014), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-downloadauth/382301; ISDA, CCP LOSS ALLOCATION AT THE END OF THE WATERFALL (2013);
JPMorgan Chase & Co., What is the Resolution Plan for CCPs?, PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 2014);
LCH.CLEARNET, CCP RISK MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY & RESOLUTION (2014),
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762448/316246_white_paper_05.12.14_v6.pd
f/a3dd194e-68e1-4302-ba63-fc1e668ea7d5.
346
Elliott, supra note 186. Elliott calls for pro rata haircuts on variation margin. Id. at 7.
Alternatively, Elliott suggests that initial margin could be subject to haircutting or that the
CCP could simply tear up contracts in order to return itself to a matched book. Id. at 8-9.
347 See, e.g., POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET, supra note 76, at 2 (“In
2005, the exponential growth of the credit derivatives market had outpaced the capabilities of
dealers’ processing systems, leading to large backlogs of unconfirmed trades. These
unconfirmed trades had potentially uncertain legal statuses, often for lengthy periods of time,
and limited the ability of dealers to accurately determine their counterparty exposures . . . .”).
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that prevents the buildup of such backlogs,348 but a reporting regime can do the same
thing. A replacement regulatory regime should provide regulators the information
they need to monitor the derivatives markets. In doing this, it will also ensure that
market participants are keeping track of their exposures to CCPs and other
counterparties.
Elements of Dodd-Frank’s reporting regime achieve this objective. Under DoddFrank, market participants report swap transactions to a swap data repository (SDR)
or to the SEC or CFTC.349 The SDR collects and confirms trade details and stores
trade data for regulators to access. SDRs350 could be retained for these purposes.
Transactions should be reported as soon as reasonably possible after they are entered
into to avoid the build-up of backlogs of unconfirmed transactions and information
should be kept current during and for some time after the swap contract’s life. DoddFrank specifies which entities possess the reporting obligation, but under a new
framework, this determination could be part of contractual negotiations. Given the
institutional nature of swaps markets, it seems unnecessary for regulators to
prescribe public reporting of swap transaction data.
Even if regulators have timely and comprehensive access to information about
the OTC derivatives markets, policymakers should not assume that regulators will
identify and preemptively solve emerging problems in those markets.351 As with
other areas, markets are more agile at gathering, analyzing, and reacting to
information than regulators are, particularly if market participants bear the
consequences of their own decisions. The recognition of regulators’ limits underlies
a regulatory framework that leaves risk management decisions and consequences
with market participants.

348
See, e.g., Ledrut & Upper, supra note 57, at 92 (“High access standards by CCPs can
serve as a catalyst for improvements in back office processes.”).
349

See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 727 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a(13)(G) (2012)) (“Each swap
(whether cleared or uncleared) shall be reported to a registered swap data repository.”); id. §
729 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6o-1(a)(1) (2012)) (allowing uncleared swaps to be reported to the
CFTC) (Parallel provisions exist for security-based swaps.)
350

Swap data repositories are defined in Dodd-Frank to mean “any person that collects and
maintains information or records with respect to transactions or positions in, or the terms and
conditions of, swaps entered into by third parties for the purpose of providing a centralized
recordkeeping facility for swaps.” Dodd-Frank Act § 721 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a (48)
(2012)). Entities that meet this definition must register with the CFTC. Id. § 728 (codified at 7
U.S.C. § 21 (2012)). SDRs should be able to choose whether to register, which would entitle
them to serve as repositories to which swap transactions could be reported to meet regulatory
requirements. Other SDRs might choose to serve non-regulatory audiences without
registering.
351 See, e.g., Friedrich August von Hayek, Prize Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel:
The Pretence of Knowledge (Dec. 11, 1974), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economic-sciences/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html (“The recognition of the insuperable
limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student of society a lesson of humility which
should guard him against becoming an accomplice in men’s fatal striving to control society - a
striving which makes him not only a tyrant over his fellows, but which may well make him
the destroyer of a civilization which no brain has designed but which has grown from the free
efforts of millions of individuals.”).
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CONCLUSION
In the exuberant wake of Dodd-Frank, few focused on the risks associated with
CCPs. Now that some time has passed, regulators and other proponents of central
clearing readily acknowledge that CCPs present difficulties and dangers.
Nevertheless, advocates of central clearing have not paid adequate attention to the
potential harmful consequences of the clearing mandate and the related regulatory
structure.
The Dodd-Frank framework has given rise to a new set of risks by compromising
the effectiveness of clearinghouse risk management, while simultaneously
encouraging CCPs to embrace new risks. Regulators perceive—likely correctly—
that they will be judged in part by how much of the OTC derivatives market is
cleared. This perception colors their regulatory oversight and distracts them from
focusing on risk. Prescriptive regulation displaces or distorts CCPs’ own risk
management initiatives. CCPs’ risk management focus is further dulled by calls to
dampen the influence of clearing members and incorporate independent decisionmakers in their corporate boards. The preference given to cleared instruments has a
secondary effect of making it more difficult for parties to manage risk outside CCPs
and less likely to monitor one another. Moreover, as CCPs grow and change in
response to government policy, expectations of a bailout deepen.
Rather than continuing down this road, policymakers should eliminate clearing
mandates, the attendant prescriptive regulatory regime for CCPs, systemic
designations of CCPs, and special Federal Reserve privileges for CCPs. A
replacement regulatory framework should consist of a broad set of principles for
CCPs, a reporting framework for cleared and uncleared swaps, a governance
framework for CCPs that includes market participants whose money is on the line,
and a clear delineation of default waterfalls and CCP recovery plans. A return to
private ordering in the OTC derivatives space would diminish bailout expectations
and allow market participants to benefit from central clearing where it makes sense,
continue to use uncleared swaps where they best manage risk, monitor and manage
both CCP and non-CCP risk effectively.
Political realities domestically and the shared international commitment to
mandatory clearing may stand in the way of the proposed return to private ordering.
If clearing mandates remain in place, policymakers can benefit from considering the
concerns raised in this article about the risks associated with mandatory clearing and
the associated regulatory structure. Regulators need to be keenly aware of the
deleterious effect poor regulatory requirements can have on CCPs’ risk management.
Supervisors should apply clearing mandates carefully and only after a full
consideration of the risks informed by adequate data. Policymakers should afford
CCPs and their participants the regulatory flexibility necessary to manage risk
effectively and should monitor CCPs closely. Regulators and market participants
should continue to work together to understand how CCPs would perform under
stressed scenarios and how losses from the default of one or more clearing members
would be allocated. Relationships among CCP supervisors have been tense in recent
years, but cooperation is critical. Regardless of whether the clearing mandate
remains in place, CCPs will continue to play an important role in the financial
system. Accordingly, efforts by regulators, market participants, and academics to
better understand, manage, and monitor CCP risk, are well worth the commitment of
resources, time, and attention.
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